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The (Surprisingly) Prevalent Role of States  
in an Era of Federalized Class Actions 
Linda S. Mullenix* 
In enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Congress 
intended to expand access to the federal courts for interstate class actions 
by creating minimal diversity and removal jurisdiction. In Section 2 of the 
Act, “Findings and Purposes,” Congress stated that class action abuses 
undermined “the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the 
Framers of the United States Constitution” in that state courts kept cases 
of national importance out of federal court and sometimes demonstrated 
bias against out-of-state defendants. Congress stated that a purpose of 
CAFA was to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States 
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate 
cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.” As many 
commentators have suggested, CAFA was intended to federalize class 
action litigation. An historical examination of dual system complex 
litigation illustrates the extent to which federal courts have successfully 
(or unsuccessfully) intervened in pending parallel state court proceedings 
through application of abstention, the Anti-Injunction Act, preclusion, 
and Erie doctrines. In the post-CAFA era, however, class action and other 
complex litigation has been federalized in derogation of state enforcement 
efforts by providing defendants with more ready access to federal courts. 
Nonetheless, state courts have retained jurisdiction over an array of 
complex litigation. Despite the federal predisposition of CAFA, states have 
retained a role in addressing complex litigation aided by Supreme Court 
decisions recognizing the independent role of state courts in enforcing 
local legal norms. To a significant extent, state courts have been insulated 
from federal judicial encroachment on states’ ability to handle complex 
litigation in its own courts, and state attorneys general have in various 
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Discussions of complex litigation generally focus on ways in 
which federal courts address large scale, aggregative litigation.1 
Commentators, however, pay less attention to state courts as 
venues for resolving complex litigation2 or the implications for 
federalism in responsibility for resolving complex disputes. 
Nonetheless, state courts routinely handle complex litigation, and 
every state but two has state class action rules.3 Several states have 
consolidation statutes4 that essentially replicate the federal 
multidistrict litigation statute.5 These state statutes permit transfer 
and consolidation to one judicial district for the efficient disposition 
of aggregate litigation in one place.6 
The existence of a dual court system complicates the ability of 
federal and state courts to address complex litigation. 
Notwithstanding these tensions, federal and state courts—through 
judicial interpretation and legislative initiatives—have developed 
means to preserve the public and private enforcement of complex 
litigation in state courts. Because parties typically forum shop 
strategically to maximize advantage, complex litigation engenders 
 
 1. See generally, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict 
Litigation in Historical Perspective, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (2018) (focusing on resolving federal 
complex litigation through federal multidistrict litigation statute); Edward F. Sherman, The 
MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 
(2008) (focusing on federal resolution of complex litigation through multidistrict litigation or 
federal class litigation). 
 2. See, e.g., Guthrie T. Abbott & Pope S. Mallette, Complex/Mass Tort Litigation in State 
Courts in Mississippi, 63 MISS. L.J. 363 (1994) (discussing influx of complex mass tort cases in 
Mississippi and ways in which state courts addressing these cases). 
 3. See Linda S. Mullenix, Should Mississippi Adopt a Class-Action Rule—Balancing the 
Equities: Ten Considerations that Mississippi Rulemakers Ought to Take into Account in Evaluating 
Whether to Adopt a State Class-Action Rule, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2005). See generally 
LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS (2006) (two-volume treatise on fifty state class 
action rules and practice). The two states lacking class action rules are Mississippi and 
Virginia. 
 4. See J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The 
Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-district Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 3, 
11–12, nn.32–33 (2012) (reporting that New York, New Jersey, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin all have developed intra-system mechanisms for 
coordinating related litigation; and that Illinois, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee have more limited intra-state procedures for intra-state coordination). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). 
 6. Glover, supra note 4. 
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fundamental issues of federalism and intersystem comity. When 
parties simultaneously file duplicative, overlapping cases in federal 
and state courts, the dual court system provokes tension between 
the courts for primacy over the litigation. When litigants invoke 
application of favorable state class action jurisprudence as against 
more restrictive federal standards, this invites convoluted Erie 
doctrinal issues. 
Until the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
(CAFA),7 plaintiffs’ attorneys were able to strategically forum shop 
for advantageous state court forums, and defense attorneys had 
little recourse to avoid state court adjudication because state courts 
were more than happy to retain their jurisdiction to the derogation 
of federal courts. With the enactment of CAFA, commentators 
generally agreed that one of the motivating rationales for this 
legislation was to federalize class action practice, particularly 
regarding mass tort litigation.8 A perhaps more cynical view of 
CAFA centered on the sponsors’ intention to relocate class litigation 
in federal courts, avoiding so-called state judicial hellholes.9 At the 
time of enactment, defense attorneys viewed federal courts as more 
favorable venues because of more restrictive federal class 
certification rulings.10 To this end, CAFA created new federal 
jurisdiction for class actions11 and provided for removal of state 
class action into federal court.12 In “federalizing” complex class 
actions, the defense bar appreciated CAFA as a victory, and 
 
 7. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 
(2018)). 
 8. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2525–26 (2008) (CAFA legislative history to federalize class actions); 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Review, Are Class Actions Unconstitutional?, 109 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1006 
(2011) (discussing CAFA’s federalization of state class actions). See generally Edward F. 
Sherman, Class Action Fairness Act and the Federalization of Class Actions, 238 F.R.D. 504 (2007). 
 9. Adam Feit, Note, Tort Reform, One State at a Time: Recent Developments in Class 
Actions and Complex Litigation in New York, Illinois, Texas, and Florida, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 899, 
901 (2008) (discussing so-called judicial hellholes); see Nicole Ochi, Note, Are Consumer Class 
and Mass Actions Dead? Complex Litigation Strategies after CAFA and MMTJA, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 965, 969 n.31 (2008) (citing AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2007 (2007), 
http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf) (describing abuses by state courts). 
 10. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the 
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1887 (2008) (“Thus, CAFA did not 
so much save defendants from biased state courts as reward them with access to an 
alternative forum that they regarded as more favorable to their interests.”). 
 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
 12. Id. § 1453. 
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plaintiffs’ attorneys regarded CAFA as a setback for class action 
claimants. 
The key contribution of this Article is to argue that although 
Congress through CAFA attempted to federalize complex class 
litigation, state courts nonetheless have continued to perform a 
significant role in addressing complex cases. Despite the federal 
predisposition of CAFA, states have retained a role in addressing 
complex litigation aided by Supreme Court decisions recognizing 
and upholding the independent role of state courts in maintaining 
and enforcing local legal norms. 
In sum, although the received understanding of CAFA was to 
federalize complex class litigation, state courts nonetheless have 
continued to perform a role in addressing complex cases. To a 
significant extent, state courts have been insulated from federal 
judicial encroachment on states’ ability to handle complex litigation 
in their own courts, and state attorneys general have in various 
ways been empowered to pursue aggregate relief on behalf of state 
citizenry. 
More specifically, several factors have helped preserve the 
states’ role in complex litigation. First, the Court has recognized 
and upheld the independent role of state courts in maintaining and 
enforcing local legal norms. Thus, the Court has upheld the 
legitimacy of state courts adjudicating state class litigation 
notwithstanding federal court repudiation of certification of the 
same litigation.13 In so doing, the Court recognized principles of 
federalism and comity, signaled a non-interference stance with 
state class proceedings, and strengthened the independent role of 
state courts in complex litigation. 
Second, a number of federal courts have rejected the primacy of 
federal courts in applying Rule 23 class certification standards in 
derogation of countervailing state statutes that would prohibit 
prosecution of the same class litigation in state court.14 
Third, the Court recognized the role of state attorneys general 
in their parens patriae capacity under CAFA to retain and pursue 
 
 13. See generally Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
 14. See infra notes 149–152. 
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complex litigation on behalf of state citizenry, in spite of defense 
attempts to evade state court jurisdiction.15 
Fourth, state attorneys general have the right to receive notice 
of federal class action settlements and to lodge comments or objec-
tions to pending settlements that might affect state constituents.16 
Thus, CAFA and the Court have given state attorneys general a 
relatively robust role in addressing complex litigation and afforded 
significant protection to state auspices in state enforcement efforts. 
Fifth, CAFA itself carved out exceptions to its removal 
provisions, again recognizing the role of states in adjudicating 
complex litigation with exceptions to its removal provisions for 
both class and “mass” actions.17 Thus, CAFA acknowledged the 
role that state courts might play in resolving completely local mass 
actions, which in turn has induced plaintiffs’ artful pleading to 
retain complex cases in state jurisdictions. 
Sixth, the Court recently rebuffed defendants’ efforts to remove 
a covered securities class action from state to federal court.18 
Instead, the Court held that the Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) did not strip state courts of their 
longstanding jurisdiction to adjudicate class actions alleging only 
§ 1933 Securities Act violations.19 In enacting SLUSA, Congress did 
nothing to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over class actions 
based on federal law. 
Finally, several federal appellate courts have agreed that state 
courts may maintain jurisdiction over defendants’ class action 
counterclaims asserted in state litigation.20 In upholding traditional 
 
 15. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014); see Loriann E. 
Fuhrer, Federal Removal More Difficult in Actions Brought by State Attorneys General, KEGLER 
BROWN HILL & RITTER (Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.keglerbrown.com/publications/ 
federal-removal-more-difficult-in-actions-brought-by-state-attorneys-general/ (noting that 
an increased obstacle to removal is bad news for corporate defendants who typically prefer 
to defend in federal court). 
 16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (requiring notification of states’ attorneys general). See 
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, CAFA Settlement Notice Provision: Optimal Regulatory Policy?, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1971 (2008). 
 17. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
 18. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018). 
 19. Id.; see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77p(c) (2018). 
 20. See, e.g., Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 
139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019); Tri-State Water Treatment, Inc. v. Bauer, 845 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 2017); 
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removal principles, these courts have resisted corporate arguments 
that CAFA expanded removal jurisdiction to permit removal of 
class action counterclaims to federal court. In 2019, the Supreme 
Court definitively clarified that the general removal statute prohibits 
the removal of state-based class action counterclaims to federal 
court, a decision largely favorable to state court class action 
plaintiffs.21 
Part I of this Article examines the private enforcement of 
complex litigation in state courts. This discussion first examines 
how federal courts historically—through the abstention doctrine22 
and the Anti-Injunction Act23—have acted or failed to preserve 
federal primacy over state court management of complex cases. 
Although there is a robust tradition of federal intervention in state 
parallel proceedings, in other instances federal courts have given 
deference to state proceedings. Against this historical backdrop, 
this Part discusses whether judicial interpretation of Erie doctrines 
support or challenge federalized class action litigation. This Part 
then analyzes how the Supreme Court more recently, through 
interpretation of preclusion doctrine, preserved the ability of states 
to pursue class litigation free from federal interference. 
Part II explores the private enforcement of complex litigation in 
state courts by examining CAFA provisions creating so-called 
carve-outs for purely local cases that are not subject to removal into 
federal court.24 As will be seen, these CAFA provisions have 
inspired artful pleading by plaintiffs who prefer to resolve complex 
cases in state courts. These plaintiffs have been successful at 
keeping their cases in state court under CAFA. 
Part III turns attention to the public enforcement of large-scale 
litigation affecting the rights of state citizens. This discussion 
surveys the role of state attorneys general in protecting citizens 
 
In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2012); Palisades Collections 
L.L.C. v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008); Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 
1014 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 21. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019). 
 22. See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 
(1983) (“Moses Cone” abstention); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800 (1976) (“Colorado River” abstention). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018); see also All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(4)(A), (B); see also id. § 1332(d)(3). 
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through parens patriae actions25 and how the Court effectively saved 
these actions from federal removal through its interpretation 
of CAFA’s mass action provisions.26 In addition, this Part examines 
the ability of state attorneys general—as provided in CAFA—to 
receive notice and provide comment on pending federal class 
action settlements.27 
Part IV examines the ability of state courts to retain jurisdiction 
over class actions alleging violations of the federal securities acts, 
and to resist attempts by defendants to remove such litigation to 
federal courts.  
Part V  explores the complex issues raised by a defendant’s 
assertion of a class action counterclaim in state court litigation, and 
the ability of a third-party defendant sued in such a counterclaim 
to remove that class litigation to federal court. The problem of class 
action counterclaims, it will be seen, not only implicates thorny 
issues of statutory construction, but directly raises the same policy 
issues of fair and appropriate forums to adjudicate class litigation 
that animate CAFA’s prescriptions. Again, these discussions 
reaffirm the conclusion that state courts still play a significant role 
in adjudicating certain types of complex litigation despite recent 
attempts to federalize complex class actions. 
I. RESTRAINING FEDERAL ENCROACHMENT  
ON STATE CLASS ACTIONS 
A. Background to Federal Intrusion into State Court Complex Litigation 
Federal intrusion into state class action litigation rose to 
prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, when federal courts managing 
complex mass tort cases moved towards settlement models for 
resolving these massive litigations.28 The American dual court 
 
 25. See generally Margaret S. Thomas, Parens Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 
69 SMU L. REV. 759 (2016) (historical survey of state attorneys general parens patriae 
enforcement powers). 
 26. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 161–63 (2014). See 
supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 27. See supra note 16. 
 28. See generally Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (repudiating a 
nationwide settlement class of asbestos claims); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591 (1997) (same); In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (approving settlement classes generally); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th 
Cir. 1989) (approving settlement class of Dalkon Shield claims). 
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system permits the institution of parallel and even duplicative 
litigation in state and federal courts. As mass tort cases emerged, 
entrepreneurial class action attorneys filed similar or exactly the 
same cases in both forums.29 
The filing of parallel duplicative litigation arising out of the 
same events or transactions creates a host of problems for the dual 
court system and the litigants pursuing relief in either or both 
jurisdictions. In addition to the economic wastefulness inherent in 
pursuing the same duplicative litigation in two forums, parallel 
litigation further inspires some questionable litigation tactics, such 
as a race to judgment in one forum or the other. Regarding class 
litigation, the existence of parallel duplicative litigation can induce 
parties to engage in a race to class certification or settlement, 
precluding adjudication in the parallel forum.30 
Moreover, the resolution of duplicative state and federal 
litigation through trial or settlement can result in inconsistent 
rulings, a consequence which offends our sense of substantive and 
procedural justice. This is especially problematic concerning 
injunctive relief, where inconsistent rulings from state and federal 
courts can create a quandary for liable defendants that may not 
know what standards apply to the actor’s forward-looking conduct. 
Finally, the problems of parallel duplicative mass tort litigation 
took on especial urgency in the 1990s when federal courts moved 
towards the settlement class model as the preferred vehicle for 
resolving the mass tort cases. In order to preserve pending federal 
mass tort settlements, judges turned to the Anti-Injunction Act31 to 
shut down or forestall parallel state court settlements that might 
undermine a federal settlement.32 
Thus, federal courts have two statutory and doctrinal means to 
preserve their primacy in massive complex litigation as against 
state enforcement in parallel proceedings: federal abstention 
 
 29. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (parallel 
duplicative lawsuits filed in both stated and federal courts relating to claims arising from 
Hyatt Regency Skywalk collapse); see also Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 
1985) (parallel mass tort salmonella litigation). 
 30. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 31. See supra note 23. 
 32. E.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993); Federal Skywalk 
Cases, 680 F.2d; In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act.33 Federal courts rarely have 
relied on abstention doctrines when confronted with parallel state 
litigation; however, when carefully applied to pending facts, federal 
courts have invoked abstention in deference to ongoing state 
proceedings.34 In contrast to the sparse use of abstention doctrines 
to maintain or decline federal jurisdiction, federal courts frequently 
have turned to the Anti-Injunction Act to protect pending federal 
class settlements endangered by parallel state litigation. Thus, the 
Anti-Injunction Act has provided the most powerful vehicle for 
federal courts to encroach upon and restrain states’ independent 
enforcement of complex litigation in their own courts. 
1. Federal Abstention in Deference to State Complex Litigation 
Federal courts have an unflagging obligation to exercise their 
rightly conferred jurisdiction.35 The Supreme Court, however, has 
indicated that federal courts may under certain circumstances 
abstain—that is, decline to exercise their valid jurisdiction in defer-
ence to pending parallel state court proceedings.36 Although 
abstention doctrine would seem to supply a ready source for 
federal retention of complex litigation, federal courts have not 
invoked abstention doctrine as a primary means to preserve their 
own jurisdiction. Instead, when federal courts carefully apply 
abstention doctrine, the courts may yield jurisdiction in deference 
to parallel complex litigation.37 
The Illinois salmonella mass tort litigation is instructive.38 The 
salmonella litigation arose out of individuals who contracted 
salmonellosis from drinking contaminated milk manufactured and 
distributed by the Jewel Companies and sold under the names of 
Hillfarm and Bluebrook. In the early 1980s, plaintiffs filed 143 
individual lawsuits in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 
and other state courts in Indiana, some of which were class actions. 
 
 33. See supra notes 22–23. 
 34. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 210. 
 35. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) 
(“Colorado River” abstention). 
 36. See generally 17A MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ch. 122 (3d ed. 2010) (federal 
abstention doctrines). 
 37. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 210. 
 38. Id. The underlying Illinois state litigation is In re Salmonella Litig., Master File No. 
85 L 000000 (cited in Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 213). 
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The Illinois cases were consolidated for discovery and other pre-
trial proceedings, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys moved for class 
certification.39 
After the plaintiffs filed the state court action different plaintiffs 
filed another identical salmonella class action in Illinois federal 
court, invoking the court’s diversity jurisdiction.40 The federal case 
was identical with the parallel state case, except for different federal 
plaintiffs. The defendant then moved the federal court to abstain 
from deciding the case—or at least from deciding plaintiff 
Schomber’s class claims—out of deference to the pending Illinois 
state court proceedings,41 citing Colorado River abstention doctrine.42 
Applying factors from Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, the federal 
court decided to abstain in favor of the pending Illinois class action.43 
The federal court first found that the federal and state lawsuits 
were “parallel”—a predicate to invoking abstention doctrine. The 
court next held that federal abstention would help to avoid 
piecemeal litigation because the burden on the defendant to litigate 
in two fora would be great. Therefore, the court decided that the 
claims should be confined to a single forum.44 Evaluating the order 
in which the parties obtained jurisdiction, the court noted that the 
state court, in the earlier action, had undertaken complex 
administrative procedures to oversee the action.45 In contrast, the 
parties had undertaken almost no pretrial discovery in the federal 
 
 39. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 213. 
 40. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2018). The federal complaint was filed on May 3, 1985, 
after the pending state court actions. At this time, there was no special diversity provisions 
for class actions, which would be created as part of CAFA in 2005. The designated class 
representative in the federal action was Allison Schomber. 
 41. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 215. 
 42. Id.; see Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 
(1976). 
 43. Schomber, 614 F. Supp. at 215–18. The Colorado River factors included: (1) the 
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum, and 
(3) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the respective forums. The Moses H. Cone 
factors included (1) the presence or absence of federal law issues, and (2) the adequacy of the 
parallel state court litigation. The decision whether to abstain is within a court’s discretion. 
Id. 
 44. Id. at 217. 
 45. Id. The court noted the state court consolidation of complaints; the assignment of 
one judge to oversee all pretrial proceedings; the organization of a committee of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to effectuate discovery and other pretrial proceedings; entry of protective orders; 
several contested hearings; and sanctions obtained against the defendant for failure to 
preserve evidence. Id. 
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court. Although the status of class certification was nascent in both 
forums, the federal court concluded that early class certification 
was more likely to occur in state court rather than in federal court.46 
The court further concluded that the absence of federal issues 
removed the one countervailing factor that would otherwise 
override concerns about avoiding piecemeal litigation.47 The final 
factor in assessing the propriety of abstention—adequacy of the 
state forum—presented no reason to weigh against abstention.48 
Few reported cases involve invocation of abstention doctrines 
to permit complex litigation to proceed in state court as opposed to 
federal court. However, the Schomber decision illustrates how a 
federal court, analyzing the Colorado River and Moses H. Cone 
abstention factors, could determine that federal abstention in favor 
of a pending parallel state class action was appropriate under the 
circumstances. While abstention doctrine is a path much less taken, 
federal courts more have frequently turned to the federal Anti-
Injunction Act as a doctrinal means for interfering with—or 
restraining from interfering with—state class action litigation. 
2. The Anti-Injunction Act Constraints of State Court Enforcement 
The intersection of the Anti-Injunction Act and state 
enforcement proceedings in private complex litigation has an 
interesting history. The federal Anti-Injunction Act states that “[a] 
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay 
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act 
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to 
protect or effectuate its judgements.”49 Generally, the Anti-
Injunction Act embodies a strong federal policy against federal 
interference with state court proceedings.50 
 
 46. Id. at 218. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. The court noted that the Illinois class action statute permitted class certification 
for classes that included out of state plaintiffs, so there was no disadvantage to proceeding 
under Illinois state law. The court also concluded that the class which the state plaintiffs 
sought to certify was in all materials respects identical to the class action in the federal 
complaint. Id. 
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2018); see also All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
 50. See generally MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 36, at ch. 121 (Anti-Injunction 
Act and three exceptions to Anti-Injunction Act). 
005.MULLENIX_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:17 AM 
1551 States in an Era of Federalized Class Actions 
 1563 
 
However, in the class action litigation arena, federal courts have 
invoked the Anti-Injunction Act both to restrain a federal court 
from interference with parallel state class litigation,51 as well as to 
uphold federal courts direct interference with state complex 
litigation to protect pending federal settlements.52 From an initial 
non-interference stance, federal courts completely reversed course 
in the mid-1980s to embrace a full-fledged exercise of federal 
authority to enjoin parallel state complex litigation. 
The potential use of the Anti-Injunction Act to constrain federal 
class proceedings in favor of pending state proceedings arose in the 
early 1980s in the federal skywalk cases.53 This litigation developed 
from the structural collapse of overhead skywalks at the Hyatt 
Regency hotel in Kansas City, Missouri in 1981. In the aftermath, 
injured claimants filed parallel class litigation in Missouri state and 
federal courts. The federal court issued a mandatory class 
certification order,54 which two objecting plaintiffs petitioned the 
court to vacate in deference to the pending state litigation.55 With 
denial of this motion, the objectors filed an appeal.56 
The appellate court first examined its own jurisdiction to hear 
the objectors’ interlocutory appeal.57 The court concluded that it 
had appellate jurisdiction to review the trial judge’s certification 
order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1),58 holding that the mandatory 
class certification order amounted to an injunction against the state 
court class proceedings.59 The appellate court concluded that the 
 
 51. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) 
 52. See, e.g., Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Joint E. 
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 53. See generally Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d. 
 54. The court certified the class under Rule 23’s “limited fund” class action, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)–(B). Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1179. 
 55. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1177. 
 56. Id. at 1179. 
 57. At this time, Rule 23 had not been amended to provide a means for interlocutory 
appeal from class certification orders, which the Advisory Committee would add by 
amendment Rule 23(f) in 1998. Appeal of the Federal Skywalk class certification order was 
brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a) and 1651 (mandamus). The judge had refused to 
certify his own order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Federal Skywalk 
Cases, 680 F.2d at 1177, 1179. 
 58. Id. at 1179–80. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2018) provides, in part: “[T]he courts of 
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: Interlocutory orders of the district courts of 
the United States . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving 
injunctions . . . .” 
 59. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1179–80. 
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class certification order effectively enjoined the state court plaintiffs 
from prosecuting their state court actions for punitive damages.60 
The court found that the class certification order enjoined the state 
plaintiffs from pursuing their state actions on the issues of liability 
for compensatory and punitive damages and the amount of 
punitive damages, and that the district court had expressly 
prohibited class members from settling their punitive damage 
claims.61 
Having concluded that the class certification order effectively 
operated as a federal injunction against state court proceedings, the 
appellate court next considered whether the federal class 
action “injunction” came within one of the three exceptions to the 
Anti-Injunction Act that would permit the federal enjoining of a 
state proceeding.62 The court concluded that none of the Anti-
Injunction Act’s exceptions applied to permit this intrusion into 
state class litigation.63 
The federal litigants primarily relied on the Anti-Injunction 
Act’s “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception to argue in favor 
of allowing the federal class action to proceed.64 They bolstered 
their argument with judicial concern for the efficient management 
of mass tort litigation—presumably in the federal forum.65 
Nonetheless, the appellate court rejected application of the 
“necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception, holding that 
historically this exception applied only to constrain tandem in rem 
litigation. The court held that because the federal and state Skywalk 
cases were both actions in personam for compensatory and punitive 
damages, the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception did not 
apply.66 Consequently, the class certification order—as an 
injunction against state class proceedings—violated the Anti-
Injunction Act and could not stand.67 
The Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act 
was a victory for state court plaintiffs, but commentators highly 
 
 60. Id. at 1180. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1181–84; see supra note 50 (exceptions to Anti-Injunction Act). 
 63. Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d at 1181–84. 
 64. Id. at 1182. 
 65. Id. at 1183. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1184. 
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criticized the court’s constricted view of the “necessary in aid of 
jurisdiction” exception.68 By the mid-1980s, federal judges would 
chip away or reject the Skywalk Anti-Injunction holding and 
completely reverse course in order to maintain control over 
complex class litigation in federal courts.69 The historical arc of the 
Anti-Injunction Act beginning in the mid-1980s illustrates a trend 
towards increasing federal exercise of power to the derogation of 
state private enforcement of complex litigation. 
Judge Jack Weinstein’s management of the New York personal 
injury asbestos mass tort litigation illustrates the federal doctrinal 
shift away from a narrow view of the Anti-Injunction Act as a 
 
 68. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing 
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 286 (1991) (noting that the Eighth Circuit’s 
construction of the Anti-Injunction Act in the Federal Skywalk cases illustrated a narrow 
interpretation of the exceptions and “extreme concern for federalism”); Robert C. Gordon, 
The Optimum Management of the Skywalks Mass Disaster Litigation by Use of the Federal 
Mandatory Class Action Device, 52 UMKC L. REV. 215, 231–32 (1984) (noting articles describing 
Eight Circuit’s decision as “’unreasonable,’ ‘untenable,’ ‘arcane,’ ‘obscure,’ ‘unnecessarily 
narrow,’ and ‘inequitable’”); Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 
IND. L.J. 507, 529, 548–50 (1987) (noting that application of Anti-Injunction Act exceptions 
defer to history, rather than well-reasoned thought). 
 69. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877, 881–82 (11th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that a federal court has the power to enjoin a state court action in order to support 
the federal court’s continuing jurisdiction over a class action and reasoning that extremely 
complex litigation is the equivalent of a “res”); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 337 
(2d Cir. 1985) (enjoining a state court action that “threatened to frustrate” a federal 
proceeding of “substantial scope” which had already required expenditure of substantial 
time and was nearing a possible settlement); Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 
903 F. Supp. 16, 18 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (finding that the AIA prohibits federal courts from 
enjoining class members from continuing to pursue in personam state actions although the 
AIA would allow a federal court to bar the commencement of new state actions); In re 
Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5142, at *6–9 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991) 
(holding that where an ongoing class action suit had been in litigation for nine years and 
where progress was finally being made in federal court, the potential for resolution justified 
enjoining state court proceedings under the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception to the AIA). 
But see In re GMC Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 134 F.3d 133, 144–45 (3d Cir. 
1998) (refusing to issue an injunction as necessary in aid of jurisdiction even though the 
federal court had previously rejected class certification and a settlement now being approved 
in state court); Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 960 F.2d 1286, 1298–99 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (refusing to interpret the “in aid of jurisdiction” exception so broadly as to allow 
injunctions with respect to all federal court class actions); Standard Microsystems Corp. v. 
Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1990) (vacating the district court’s injunction 
of a state court action as a violation of the AIA, even though the suit involved the same claims 
as the federal court action, and distinguishing Baldwin because here the federal court was not 
on the verge of settling a complex matter); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prods. Litig., MDL-
991, 1995 WL 489480, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 1995) (refusing to issue an injunction as 
necessary in aid of jurisdiction even though the federal court had previously rejected class 
certification and a settlement now being approved in state court). 
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constraint on federal courts’ ability to interfere with parallel state 
complex litigation.70 In the asbestos litigation, the parties accom-
plished a class-wide settlement agreement and the court 
conditionally certified a mandatory limited fund class pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(B).71 Judge Weinstein 
noted that the certification of the mandatory national class action 
would enjoin all pending cases, including those filed in state court, 
which implicated the Anti-Injunction Act.72 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in the Skywalk cases, Judge Weinstein 
viewed “the ‘necessary in aid of jurisdiction’ exception liberally ‘to 
prevent a state court from . . . interfering with a federal court’s 
flexibility and authority’ to decide the case before it.”73 Citing an 
array of Second Circuit precedents,74 Judge Weinstein held that a 
stay of state court proceedings was appropriate under the 
“necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception where a federal court 
was on the verge of settling a complex matter and state court 
proceedings would undermine the federal court’s ability to achieve 
that objective.75 
Cognizant that courts historically interpreted the “necessary in 
aid of jurisdiction” exception as applying solely to parallel in rem 
actions, Judge Weinstein creatively concluded that the mandatory 
nature of the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) limited fund settlement was like a res, 
and that “under these circumstances, the in rem nature of the court’s 
jurisdiction over the class action and the limited fund provides an 
additional ground for concluding that a stay of all existing 
 
 70. See generally In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. 32 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 71. Id. at 33–36. 
 72. Id. at 36. 
 73. Id. at 37 (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 
295 (1970)). 
 74. Id. (citing Standard Microsystems Corp. v. Texas Instruments Inc., 916 F.2d 58, 60 
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 907 F.2d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1990) (stay 
of state court proceedings appropriate to allow federal district judge to “legitimately assert 
comprehensive control over complex litigation”); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 
337 (2d Cir. 1985) (a federal court can issue an injunction against actions in state court that 
would “frustrate the district court’s efforts to craft a settlement”). 
 75. Judge Weinstein further held that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018), 
likewise provided federal courts with an affirmative grant of power to certify a nationwide 
class action and to stay pending federal and state cases brought on behalf of class members. 
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 37. 
005.MULLENIX_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:17 AM 
1551 States in an Era of Federalized Class Actions 
 1567 
 
proceedings is consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act.”76 In so 
doing, Judge Weinstein reached a seeming contradictory conclusion 
from that of the Eighth Circuit in the Skywalk litigation.77 
Judge Weinstein’s Anti-Injunction Act decision subsequently 
gained traction in other mass tort cases on the federal dockets.78 
After parties in the Pennsylvania federal district court reached a 
tentative nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class settlement of 
asbestos claims, other plaintiffs filed a parallel class action in West 
Virginia state court naming the same defendants.79 These plaintiffs 
sought a declaration that the proposed federal settlement was 
unenforceable and not entitled to full faith and credit in the West 
Virginia courts, and was not binding on the members of the 
purported West Virginia class. They further sought a declaration 
that they were adequate representatives with the authority to opt-
out of the federal settlement on behalf of the entire West Virginia 
class. 
Instead, relying on the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” 
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Pennsylvania district court 
granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
enjoining the West Virginia plaintiffs and their attorneys from 
taking any further steps in the prosecution of their state claims, or 
from pursuing similar duplicative litigation in any other forum.80 
The Third Circuit upheld this exercise of federal power,81 noting 
that the prospect of federal settlement was imminent, as in other 
cases where federal courts had issued injunctions.82 Moreover, the 
court found further justification for issuance of the injunction 
 
 76. Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig, 134 F.R.D. at 38. See also Baldwin-United, 770 F.2d 
at 337 (“[A] class action proceeding [was] so far advanced that it was the virtual equivalent 
of a res over which the district judge required full control.”). 
 77. Judge Weinstein distinguished and limited the Skywalk holding, suggesting that 
the ground for vacating the class certification in the Skywalk litigation was the absence of a 
limited fund: “Properly construed, Skywalk stands only for the proposition that where class 
certification is improper because no limited fund exists, a court cannot rely upon the 
‘necessary in aid of jurisdiction’ exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to justify a stay of 
existing state proceedings.” Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 39. 
 78. See generally Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 79. Id. at 195–96. 
 80. Id. at 196. 
 81. Id. at 202–04 (citing In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 83-0268, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5142 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1991), aff’d mem., 950 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1991)). The court also relied on 
the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2018). Carlough, 10 F.3d at 202–03. 
 82. Id. at 203. 
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against the state court class proceedings, concluding that the West 
Virginia plaintiffs were not requesting relief strictly parallel to the 
federal plaintiffs. Instead of seeking compensatory damages for 
their injuries, the West Virginia plaintiffs were using the state court 
lawsuit to “challenge the propriety of the federal class action:” in 
other words, “as a preemptive strike against the viability of the 
federal suit.”83 In addition, the West Virginia plaintiffs were 
attempting to use the state class action to obtain state court rulings 
regarding the state class members’ rights “to opt out of the federal 
action.”84 Given the “mature” phase of the federal settlement 
proceedings, and to avoid confusion and havoc, the Third  
Circuit upheld the issuance of the injunction against the state  
class proceedings.85 
B. Shady Grove and Federalizing Class Action Litigation:  
Erie Implications 
In 2010, the Court in Shady Grove was confronted with a 
complicated issue challenging the ability of federal courts to apply 
federal class action jurisprudence in a diversity class action, as 
opposed to state law pursuant to Erie principles.86 In a famously 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 204. The court held: 
At this mature phase of the settlement proceedings and after years of pre-trial 
negotiation, a mass opting out of West Virginia plaintiffs clearly would be 
disruptive to the district court’s ongoing settlement management and would 
jeopardize the settlement’s fruition. In addition, mass opting out presents a 
likelihood that the members of the West Virginia class will be confused as to their 
membership status in the dueling lawsuits. All members of the [West Virginia] 
class are only now receiving notice of the federal suit. A declaration by the West 
Virginia court at this time that all West Virginia members of the federal class are 
now in the West Virginia suit (and we make no comment as to the legal authority 
of the West Virginia court to so rule) could cause havoc.  
  . . . . 
  We find it difficult to imagine a more detrimental effect upon the district 
court’s ability to effectuate the settlement of this complex and far-reaching matter 
than would occur if the West Virginia state court was permitted to make a 
determination regarding the validity of the federal settlement. 
Id. 
 86. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010); Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
005.MULLENIX_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:17 AM 
1551 States in an Era of Federalized Class Actions 
 1569 
 
complicated array of decisions,87 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion 
concluded that under Erie principles a federal court’s authority to 
apply federal Rule 23 class certification standards preempted a 
New York state statute that prohibited class status for suits seeking 
statutory interest penalties.88 
Shady Grove arose in the court’s diversity jurisdiction and the 
insurance defendant asked the court to dismiss the federal class 
action because it was prohibited under New York law. The district 
court granted the dismissal, which the Second Circuit upheld.89 
Finding that the New York provision conflicted with Rule 23, the 
plurality held that Rule 23 applied as a valid exercise of authority 
under the Rules Enabling Act90 in derogation of the different 
standard under New York state law.91 
Construing the Shady Grove facts as an Erie problem, the Court’s 
plurality made scant reference to principles of comity or federalism 
integral to the Bayer appeal, or for that matter, Erie doctrine. The 
plurality understood, however, that in “keeping the federal-court 
door open to class actions that cannot proceed in state court” this 
would induce forum shopping.92 Nonetheless, the plurality came 
down on the side of favoring uniform federal procedure: 
But divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of 
forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say 
intended) result of a uniform system of federal procedure. 
Congress itself has created the possibility that the same case may 
follow a different course if filed in federal instead of state 
court. The short of the matter is that a Federal Rule governing 
procedure is valid whether or not it alters the outcome of the case 
in a way that induces forum shopping. To hold otherwise would 
 
 87. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 395. There was no majority decision in Shady Grove. Four 
Justices formed the plurality opinion: Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, and 
Scalia. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment and concurred in part. Four Justices 
dissented: Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. 
 88. Id. at 398–99. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) (McKinney 1975) (precluding actions to 
recover penalties from proceeding as a class action). 
 89. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 397–98. 
 90. Id. at 406–11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072(b) (2018) (Rules Enabling Act conferring 
rulemaking authority on federal courts provided that the rules not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify substantive rights). 
 91. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–11. 
 92. Id. at 415. 
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be to “disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over 
federal procedure” or Congress’s exercise of it.93 
In contrast, the Shady Grove dissenters94 contended that in 
diversity cases federal courts had to apply some state procedural 
rules that functioned as a part of the state’s definition of substantive 
rights and remedies. Writing for the dissenters, Justice Ginsburg 
construed the New York statute as a manifestation of New York’s 
legislative interest in cabining available remedies. Therefore, the 
dissenters would have upheld the federal court’s dismissal of the 
litigation. 
The dissenting opinion manifests a more robust concern for 
issues of federalism and comity in the class action litigation arena, 
and is littered with multiple pronouncements indicating that state 
interests in diversity cases “warrant our respectful consideration.”95 
Citing Justice Harlan, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that Erie 
doctrine was “one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, 
expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial 
power between the state and federal system.”96 Thus, in parsing 
Erie doctrine, Justice Ginsburg concluded that Rule 23 and the New 
York statute did not conflict, giving rise to no preemption 
problem.97 In her view, the plurality failed to engage in this 
threshold inquiry whether the federal rule and the state statute 
conflicted. Had the Court done this, “it would not have read Rule 
23 to collide with New York’s legitimate interest in keeping certain 
monetary awards reasonably bounded.”98 
Justice Ginsburg pointed to several Erie decisions where the 
Court counseled federal courts to interpret the federal rules with 
 
 93. Id. at 415–16 (citation omitted). 
 94. Id. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 443. 
 96. Id. at 437–38 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
 97. Id. at 445–46. 
 98. Id. at 437. The dissent also stated that  
  “[b]y finding a conflict without considering whether Rule 23 rationally 
should be read to avoid any collision, the Court unwisely and unnecessarily 
retreats from the federalism principles undergirding Erie. Had the Court reflected 
on the respect for state regulatory interests endorsed in our decisions, it would 
have found no cause to interpret Rule 23 so woodenly—and every reason not to 
do so.  
Id. at 451. 
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sensitivity to important state interests, and to avoid conflict with 
important state regulatory policies.99 She indicated that she “would 
continue to interpret Federal Rules with awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, important state regulatory policies.”100 In conclusion, 
Justice Ginsburg noted the irony inspired by enactment of CAFA, 
which opened the door to state-based class actions to be removed 
to federal courts. In so doing, Congress envisioned fewer—and not 
more—class actions overall. Thus, “Congress surely never 
anticipated that CAFA would make federal courts a mecca for suits 
of the kind Shady Grove has launched: class actions seeking state-
created penalties for claims arising under state law—claims that 
would be barred from class treatment in the [s]tate’s own courts.”101 
C. The Class Action Fairness Act, Smith v. Bayer,  
and Non-Preclusion of Class Certification Decisions 
The influx of the massive complex class litigation on federal and 
state court dockets in the late 1970s and early 1980s inspired a crisis 
mentality, inspiring numerous institutional studies and reform 
proposals.102 After a decade of adventuresome and creative judicial 
case management of mass tort cases during this period,103 including 
efforts at joint federal-state coordination of these cases,104 federal 
 
 99. Id. at 442. Justice Ginsburg suggested that the Court had “veer[ed] away” from 
this approach, in favor of a mechanical reading of the federal rules, which was “insensitive 
to state interests and productive of discord.” Id. at 442–43; see also id. at 457–58 (“We have 
long recognized the impropriety of displacing, in a diversity action, state-law limitations on 
state-created remedies.”). 
 100. Id. at 437. 
 101. Id. at 459. 
 102. See, e.g., MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: 
TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES (1988); SPECIAL 
COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. SYS., AM. BAR ASS’N, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE 
CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984); 
Am. Bar Ass’n, Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action 
Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986); AM. LAW INSTIT., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS (1994). 
 103. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions—Past, Present, and Future, 92 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1008 (2017) (commenting on the early period of adventuresome 
management innovations by district courts in handling mass tort cases); Linda S. Mullenix, 
Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 522 
(2013) (commenting on adventuresome efforts by federal courts in the 1980s to resolve mass 
tort class litigation). 
 104. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the 
Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation Pending 
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courts reversed course in a landmark series of decisions that 
signaled antipathy towards resolving mass tort class litigation in 
federal courts.105 The federal courts indicated that the proposed 
mass tort litigations could not satisfy the Rule 23 requirements, 
especially the predominance criterion because of the presence of 
highly individualized issues of causation, liability, and proof. In 
addition, these proposed nationwide mass tort cases implicated 
complex choice of law issues, as well as Seventh Amendment 
relitigation problems.106 
At the end of the 20th century, the Supreme Court further 
buttressed this federal hostility to sweeping classwide remedies, 
rejecting two landmark nationwide asbestos class settlements.107 
Given the federal courts’ manifest lack of receptivity towards 
adjudicating class litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys instead turned to 
state courts as the forums of choice for pursuing resolution of 
complex class litigation.108 
Between 1995 and 2005, state courts became the plaintiffs’ 
forums of choice for class certification and settlement. Several state 
court venues that embraced liberal certification and settlement 
standards proved especially receptive to class litigation, becoming 
magnet courts for forum-shopping litigants.109 In turn, the defense 
 
in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529 (1995); William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial 
Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 
(1992). 
 105. See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1090 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertification of 
nationwide class of penile implant claimants); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 
(5th Cir. 1996) (reversal of certification of nationwide class action of nicotine-addicted 
claimants); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing 
certification of nationwide HIV tainted blood products class). 
 106. See generally  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. 393. 
 107. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods, Inc. v Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also Lahav, supra note 103, at 1007–08 (decisions in Fibreboard and 
Amchem closed off possibility of mass tort settlements). 
 108. See 3 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 22.12 (4th ed. 2018) (“The reluctance of federal courts to certify such classes over the next 
decade, the move by plaintiffs to state court for class action certification, the enactment of 
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) removing many state court class actions to federal 
court, all contributed to the reduced likelihood that a Rule 23(b)(3) class will be certified for 
a mass tort class.”). 
 109. A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 245 
(2007) (describing legislative history to CAFA and need to combat plaintiffs’ lawyers’ ability 
to game the system to keep nationwide class litigation in state courts); John Stevens, Note, 
Securing “Steady, Upright and Impartial Administration of the Laws”—The Federalist-Based 
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bar protested against what it deemed the defendants’ consignment 
to plaintiff-favoring judicial hellholes and the ability of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to “game the system” and keep class litigation in favor-
able state courts.110 During this decade, defense interests united to 
promote Congress to enact federal legislation to redress the 
perceived pro-plaintiff imbalance in forum opportunities.111 This 
legislative initiative succeeded in the 2005 enactment of the Class 
Action Fairness Act.112 
CAFA created a new federal diversity jurisdiction provision in 
Rule 23 for class actions and added a new statutory provision for 
state class actions to be removed to federal court.113 Pursuant to 
CAFA, a proposed class has to embrace at least 100 claimants with 
an aggregated amount in controversy in excess of $5 million. CAFA 
further authorized jurisdiction over class actions that satisfied 
minimal diversity requirements.114 In addition to the original 
diversity provisions, CAFA also enacted new removal provisions 
for state class actions.115 These removal provisions eliminated the 
general removal requirement that all defendants agree to the 
removal, and they eliminated the one-year removal deadline.116 
CAFA’s enactment heralded a return of class litigation back to 
federal courts, because for the first time Rule 23 explicitly created a 
rule basis for diversity class actions and enhanced the federal forum 
opportunity by requiring only minimal diversity among the parties 
to the litigation.117 The new removal statute similarly facilitated the 
removal of state class actions to federal court by relieving the 
removing defendants of certain requirements in the general 
 
Imperative For Class Action Reform, 3 GEO. J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 361, 367 (2005) (describing 
plaintiffs’ manipulative behavior to accomplish questionable class certifications and 
settlements in state courts). 
 110. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 11. 
 111. Class Action Fairness Act of 2001: Hearing on H.R. 2341 Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 49 (2002) (testimony of John Beisner, defense attorney involved in 
drafting CAFA legislation). 
 112. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 113. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2018). 
 114. Id. § 1332(d). 
 115. Id. § 1453. 
 116. Id. § 1453(b). 
 117. Id. § 1332(d). 
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removal statutes, such as the requirement that all defendants 
consent to the removal.118 
In the broader context of dual-system federalism, CAFA 
represented a rebalancing of power and authority over complex 
litigation in favor of federal forums. In practical terms, CAFA 
represented a victory for defense interests and a setback for the 
plaintiffs’ class action bar. While academic scholars focused on 
CAFA’s implications for theories of federalism,119 attorneys viewed 
CAFA less in abstract conceptual notions of federalism and more in 
the strategic ramifications for controlling litigation outcomes. 
Against this background, then, the Supreme Court’s 2011 
decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp.,120 in which the Court returned 
power to state courts in the conduct of their class litigation, proved 
something of a surprise, especially following the Court’s decision 
in Shady Grove in the preceding year. Although CAFA signaled the 
opening of a new era of federalized complex litigation, the Supreme 
Court in 2011 threw a surprising “lifeline” to state courts in their 
ability to retain independent authority over class action litigation.121 
The Court’s Bayer decision presents an interesting contrast to  
Shady Grove. 
In Bayer, a unanimous Court held that a West Virginia state 
court retained the ability to determine whether a West Virginia 
class action was suitable for class certification under state rules, 
notwithstanding that a Minnesota federal district judge had denied 
class certification in a parallel class action brought against the same 
defendant.122 
The Bayer litigation returned to the vexing problem of parallel, 
duplicative class litigation in federal and state courts. While CAFA 
enabled defendants to remove state class litigation to federal court, 
 
 118. Id. § 1453. 
 119. See, e.g., David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism 
Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247 (2007) (discussing 
federalism implications of CAFA); Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class 
Action Rule and the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate 
Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1929 (2008) (discussing federalism implications of 
CAFA). 
 120. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299 (2011). 
 121. See generally Mark Moller, The New Class Action Federalism, 48 AKRON L. REV. 861, 
866–74 (2015) (characterizing the Court’s decision in Smith v. Bayer as “The Roberts Court 
Throws Federalism a Lifeline”). 
 122. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 302. 
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it did not completely forestall the institution and pursuit of state 
class litigation. Hence, although the defense bar had gained a 
forum-strategic advantage through CAFA, this advantage would 
be lost if plaintiffs could simply circumvent the consequences of an 
adverse federal certification by filing in a more plaintiff-friendly 
state court. Whereas federal courts had developed a substantial 
Anti-Injunction Act jurisprudence relating to state court litigation 
in deference to pending federal class settlements,123 the courts had 
not developed a similar doctrinal approach to class certification 
decisions. 
Although the Court touched on the underlying federalism 
concerns in Bayer only in passing, the Bayer litigation provides an 
interesting illustration of the intersection of federalism concerns 
with complex litigation that parties pursue in a dual-court system. 
George McCollins sued the Bayer Corporation in West Virginia 
state court alleging various state law claims arising from Bayer’s 
sale of the prescription drug Baycol. The plaintiff contended that 
Bayer violated the West Virginia consumer protection statute and 
express and implied warranties in selling him a defective product. 
He asked the state court to certify a class action of West Virginia 
residents pursuant to West Virginia’s Rule of Civil Procedure 23.124 
Shortly after McCollins filed his lawsuit, another plaintiff, Keith 
Smith, sued Bayer in a different West Virginia state court alleging 
claims similar to McCollins’s action. Smith also requested the court 
to certify a West Virginia class under the West Virginia class action 
rule. Bayer then removed McCollins’s case to the District Court for 
the Southern District of West Virginia based on diversity juris-
diction.125 After removal to federal court, McCollins’s case was 
transferred to the District of Minnesota, which was overseeing a 
multidistrict consolidation of Baycol litigation in federal courts.126 
Bayer was unable to remove Smith’s case to federal court because 
Smith had joined several non-diverse defendants in his lawsuit, 
thereby defeating a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction and 
 
 123. See Andrea R. Lucas, Note, Balancing Comity with the Protection of Preclusion: The 
Scope of the Relitigation Exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 97 VA. L. REV. 1475, 1478–90 (2011) 
(historical interpretation and application of the Anti-Injunction Act relitigation exception); 
supra notes 49–84. 
 124. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 303. 
 125. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 (2018) (diversity and removal jurisdiction statutes). 
 126. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 303; see 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (multidistrict litigation statute). 
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frustrating removal.127 Smith’s suit remained in West Virginia  
state court. 
The Minnesota federal court first decided McCollins’s motion 
to certify a class of West Virginia Baycol purchasers, before 
consideration of class certification in state court. The federal court 
declined to certify the proposed class on two grounds. First, 
construing West Virginia law, the court concluded that the case 
could not be certified because each individual class member would 
have to show actual injury to recover for the claimant’s use of 
Baycol. Second, the court determined that individual issues 
predominated over common issues, therefore failing to satisfy the 
Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement for class certification.128 
Bayer then requested that the Minnesota federal court enjoin 
the West Virginia state court from hearing Smith’s motion for class 
certification, arguing that Smith’s case was identical to the 
proposed West Virginia Baycol class action that the federal court 
declined to certify. The district court granted Bayer’s motion, 
concluding that the restraining order was appropriate in order to 
protect its judgment in the McCollins lawsuit, relying on the third 
“relitigation exception” to the Anti-Injunction Act.129 
Thus, the Bayer litigation shifted judicial concern from the 
settlement arena to the Anti-Injunction Act’s authority to empower 
federal courts to intervene in pending state class certification 
proceedings, a much earlier stage in class litigation. This inquiry 
focused on a different Anti-Injunction Act exception than the “in 
aid of jurisdiction” provision that courts invoked to protect federal 
settlements. Similar to the line of cases upholding federal court 
authority to enjoin pending state class litigation to protect 
settlement class agreements, the district court concluded that the 
relitigation exception authorized interference with the West Virginia 
court’s ability to certify a class action. 
 
 127. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 303. 
 128. Id. at 304; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (predominance requirement). The court also 
dismissed McCollins’s claims on the merits, for his failure to show actual physical injury 
from his use of Baycol. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 304. 
 129. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 302–03. The “relitigation exception” is the third exception to the 
Anti-Injunction Act, which permits a federal court to enjoin a state court proceeding to 
“protect or effectuate [the federal court’s] judgments.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2283; supra notes 49–
50. 
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s order.130 The court held that the Anti-Injunction Act’s 
relitigation exception authorized the federal injunction because 
issue preclusion rules barred Smith from seeking certification of his 
state class action. The court reasoned that Smith was invoking a 
similar class action rule and the same legal theories to seek 
certification of the same class as McCollins. The state court class 
certification issue was sufficiently identical to the federal 
certification issue to warrant preclusion. In addition, the court 
found that McCollins’s and Smith’s interests were aligned, and 
therefore Smith was bound by the federal court’s judgment.131 
The Supreme Court reversed. Citing recent precedent,132 the 
Court acknowledged that the relitigation exception authorized 
federal courts to prevent state litigation of a claim or issue that was 
previously presented to and decided by a federal court.133 
However, the Court further suggested that a federal court could 
enjoin a state court proceeding “only if preclusion is clear beyond 
peradventure.”134 Hence, the Court’s evaluation of the lower 
courts’ propriety in issuing the injunction against West Virginia 
state court proceedings devolved into a convoluted discussion of 
the requirements of preclusion doctrine.135 
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s reliance on the near-
identity of the text of the federal and West Virginia class action 
rules as the basis for concluding that issue preclusion was 
appropriate under the relitigation exception. The Court noted: 
That was the right place to start, but not to end. Federal and state 
courts, after all, can and do apply identically worded procedural 
provisions in widely varying ways. If a State’s procedural provision 
tracks the language of a Federal Rule, but a state court interprets 
that provision in a manner federal courts have not, then the state 
 
 130. In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 593 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 131. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 305. 
 132. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140 (1988). 
 133. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 306; see Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 147. 
 134. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 307. The Court noted that “[d]eciding whether and how prior 
litigation has preclusive effect is usually the bailiwick of the second court (here, the one in 
West Virginia). So issuing an injunction under the relitigation exception is resorting to heavy 
artillery.” Id. 
 135. Id. at 308–17. 
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court is using a different standard and thus deciding a 
different issue.136 
With this nod towards federal deference to state court 
proceedings, the Court pointed out that “the West Virginia 
Supreme Court has gone some way toward resolving the matter 
before us by declaring its independence from federal courts’ inter-
pretation of the Federal Rules—and particularly of Rule 23.”137 The 
Court observed that in other pharmaceutical class litigation, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court had eschewed the litigants’ reliance 
on federal class certification precedents, seeking “to avoid having 
[their] legal analysis of [their] Rules ‘amount to nothing more than 
Pavlovian responses to federal decisional law.’”138 Moreover, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court’s approach to the Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance requirement differed from that of federal juris-
prudence; therefore, a state court using the state standard would 
most likely decide a class certification decision differently than an 
earlier federal court determining the same issue.139 The Court held 
that a federal and state court could apply different law, and a 
federal court’s determination of one issue does not preclude the 
state court’s determination of another. “It then goes without saying 
that the federal court may not issue an injunction.”140 
The Court further rejected the federal court’s binding Smith to 
the federal class certification judgment as a nonparty to that 
litigation.141 The Court observed that the doctrine rejecting 
nonparty preclusion countered Bayer’s policy argument relating to 
dual-system class litigation. Bayer contended that reversal of the 
 
 136. Id. at 309–10. The Court continued: “So a federal court considering whether the 
relitigation exception applies should examine whether state law parallels its federal 
counterpart. But as suggested earlier, the federal court must resolve any uncertainty on that 
score by leaving the question of preclusion to the state courts.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 137. Id. at 310. 
 138. Id. at 310–11 (citing In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 61 (W. Va. 2003) (class 
certification in pharmaceutical mass tort approved)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 312. 
 141. Id. at 314–15. The Court concluded that the federal denial of class certification 
could not bind Smith, a nonparty to the rejected class. The Court determined that because 
Federal Rule 23 requirements were not satisfied, no properly conducted class action existed 
at any time during the dual class proceedings. In absence of certification under Rule 23, the 
precondition for binding Smith to the federal decision was not met. The Court noted that the 
weight of scholarly authority agreed that an uncertified class action could not bind proposed 
class members. Id. at 316 n.11. 
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Eight Circuit’s decision would encourage serial relitigation of class 
certification decisions, with unsuccessful federal litigants 
decamping to more receptive state courts in order to obtain class 
certification.142 The Court concluded that “principles of stare decisis 
and comity among courts [would] mitigate the sometimes 
substantial costs of similar litigation brought by different 
plaintiffs[,]” but that the right approach did not lie in binding 
nonparties to a judgment.143 
Finally, the Court noted that congressional enactment of CAFA 
largely abated the issues raised by the Bayer dual-court litigation. 
CAFA was not in effect when McCollins and Smith filed their West 
Virginia class actions. Because CAFA created a minimal diversity 
jurisdiction statute for class litigation, if CAFA had been in effect 
then, Bayer could have removed Smith’s class action to federal 
court where it would have been transferred to the Minnesota MDL 
for a unified class certification decision.144 
Thus, the Court’s Bayer holding was narrowly confined to its 
pre-CAFA facts and of limited doctrinal import for future post-
CAFA litigation. In deciding Bayer, the Court clearly focused on 
articulating preclusion doctrine,145 paying less attention to issues 
(or policy concerns) presented by dual-court class litigation. The 
Court clearly thought the nub of the problem lay in appropriate 
application of preclusion doctrine, suggesting that litigants who 
were disgruntled with the Court’s holding could seek congressional 
modification of established preclusion doctrine.146 
 
 142. Id. at 316 (“Bayer warns that under our approach class counsel can repeatedly try 
to certify the same class ‘by the simple expedient of changing the named plaintiff in the 
caption of the complaint.’”). 
 143. Id. at 317. 
 144. Id. 
 145. A good deal of scholarly commentary on the Bayer decision likewise focused on 
the implications of preclusion doctrine as applied to class litigation. See generally Richard D. 
Freer, Preclusion and the Denial of Class Certification: Avoiding the “Death by a Thousand Cuts,” 
99 IOWA. L. REV. BULL. 85 (2014); Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a 
Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class Action, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1659 (2014). 
 146. Bayer, 564 U.S. at 318 n.12 (“[N]othing in our holding today forecloses legislation 
to modify established principles of preclusion should Congress decide that CAFA does not 
sufficiently prevent relitigation of class certification motions. Nor does this opinion at all 
address the permissibility of a change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to 
this question.”). 
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Notably, the Court made only passing reference to principles of 
federalism, offhandedly suggesting that “[f]inally, we would expect 
federal courts to apply principles of comity to each other’s class 
certification decisions when addressing a common dispute.”147 In 
spite of its relatively under-developed discussion of federalism 
concerns, the Court reiterated that in evaluating Anti-Injunction 
Act issues, the Court for more than forty years consistently had 
maintained that “[a]ny doubts . . . should be resolved in favor of 
permitting the state courts to proceed.”148 The Court concluded that 
the Bayer litigation did not strike the Court as even a close issue 
because the issues in the federal and state lawsuits differed because 
the relevant legal standards differed. Moreover, the mere proposal 
of a class in the federal action could not bind parties who were not 
parties there.149 
Although the Court’s Bayer decision is cabined by its unique 
time-bound facts,150 it nonetheless reflects the Court’s deferential 
mindset towards the role of independent state class litigation in a 
dual court system.151 Significantly, Bayer was a unanimous decision, 
suggesting that the issues relating to dual-court class litigation 
were not resolved along liberal-conservative ideological lines.152 
The Court’s deferential attitude, rhetorically grounded in principles 
of comity,153 marks a departure from the appellate courts’ Anti-
Injunction Act “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” line of decisions. 
Whereas the appellate courts had weaponized the Anti-Injunction 
Act to permit intervention in parallel state class litigation, the Court 
 
 147. Id. at 317. 
 148. Id. at 318 (alterations in original) (quoting Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of 
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U. S. 281, 297 (1970)). 
 149. Id. at 318. 
 150. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Multiple Attempts at Class Certification, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 137, 138, 142–44 (2014) (criticizing the Court’s decision in Bayer; suggesting unresolved 
broader questions of preclusion doctrine, federal common law, and due process constraints). 
 151. See Mallori Allen, Note, Classing Up the Relitigation Exception?: Federalism, 
Injunctions, and Class Actions in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368  (2011), 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
219, 232–36 (2012) (arguing that Bayer decision still has importance in post-CAFA 
environment because class actions can still remain in state courts). 
 152. Court watchers might have anticipated that the Court’s conservative wing would 
have decided in favor of the Eighth Circuit’s order restraining relitigation of the class 
certification decision (the argument advanced by the defendant Bayer), while the Court’s 
liberal wing would have favored the independent ability of the West Virginia state courts to 
decide the class certification anew. 
 153. See Lucas, supra note 123, at 1513–18 (arguing in favor of narrow interpretation of 
the Anti-Injunction relitigation exception in the interests of comity and federalism). 
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in Bayer constrained the use of the Anti-Injunction Act for this 
purpose. Instead, the Court reiterated its longstanding under-
standing of the Anti-Injunction Act as a restriction on federal 
interference with state court proceedings. 
In hindsight, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend why the 
Court granted certiorari and decided the appeal in Bayer. With the 
enactment of CAFA, the certification issue presented in Bayer 
became a self-correcting problem. Indeed, the Court recognized 
this in its closing remarks.154 Simply stated, in the post-CAFA 
litigation world, the problem presented in Bayer is unlikely to be 
replicated and the Court need not have decided the case. Post-
CAFA, minimally diverse state class actions such as Smith’s are 
now subject to removal, thereby obviating the need for a federal 
injunction against a proposed state class certification because the 
state class action would no longer be present in state court. Apart 
from the opportunity to expound on preclusion doctrine, the 
Court’s Bayer decision seems an occasion to endorse doctrines of 
comity and federalism regarding dual system class litigation. 
In both Shady Grove and Bayer, the defendants acted in rational 
self-interest based on their understanding of the advantages or 
disadvantages of federal class action jurisprudence compared to 
underlying state law. Although the Court in these cases located the 
issues in federalism concerns, the litigants were motivated less by 
abstract federalism concepts than outcome-driven strategy. The 
federal defendant’s request for dismissal in Shady Grove was 
intended to avoid federal certification standards (that would have 
permitted certification) in deference to more restrictive state class 
standards (that would have prohibited the class proceeding). Thus, 
the Shady Grove defendant desired application of state law to avoid 
federal class proceedings. In Bayer, on the other hand, the federal 
defendant—having successfully defeated class certification under 
federal standards—sought to enjoin the West Virginia court from 
proceeding precisely because the more liberal West Virginia class 
certification standards would have allowed the class to proceed in 
 
 154. See id. 
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state court.155 The Bayer defendant, then, desired application of 
federal law to avoid state class proceedings. 
Whereas the Shady Grove Court preempted state law based on 
its understanding of Erie doctrine as applied to conflicting federal 
and state rules, the Bayer Court one year later acknowledged that 
the differing class certification standards required the Minnesota 
federal court to yield to the West Virginia state court. In Shady 
Grove, the Court parsed Erie doctrine to give primacy to federal 
adjudication of class litigation unfettered by countervailing state 
law; in Bayer, the Court parsed preclusion doctrine to reach the 
opposite result. 
The Shady Grove plurality opinion by no means settled the issue 
of conflicting class certification standards in a dual-court system—
the problem of inconsistent federal and state class standards 
persists. Indeed, the Shady Grove dissenting and concurring opinions 
provided courts with alternative grounds to give primacy to state 
law regarding class litigation, and several federal courts have so 
ruled. For example, several states have consumer protection 
statutes that prohibit plaintiffs from pursuing class action relief 
under those laws.156 In addressing whether a federal court should 
apply Rule 23 to disallow the actions, some federal courts have 
followed Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion to preempt state law 
provisions that disallow class action treatment of certain types of 
claims.157 However, other courts have concluded that state statutes 
differ from the statutes in Shady Grove and its progeny, instead 
defining substantive rights (or what a consumer needs to prove in 
 
 155. For an excellent discussion of the political and ideological implications of the Shady 
Grove opinions, and the seemingly inexplicable alignment of liberal and conservative Justices 
either supporting or rejecting federal class proceedings over more restrictive state class 
litigation statutes, see Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism: Erie and the Rules 
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1178–79 (2011). 
 156. See Wilson v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 17-23033-Civ-Scola, 2018 WL 
4623539, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (citing the consumer protection laws of Ohio and 
Utah as examples); see also Delgado v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, L.L.C., No. 13-CV-4427 (NGG) 
(ST), 2017 WL 5201079, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2017) (consumer protection statutes of 
Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee explicitly prohibit class actions to enforce terms). 
 157. See Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 
2015) (upholding application of Rule 23 to permit class proceedings in federal court; 
prohibition of private class claims under Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act superseded 
by Rule 23, much like state statute under review in Shady Grove); Fejzulai v. Sam’s W., Inc., 
205 F. Supp. 3d 723, 726 (D.S.C. 2016) (citing Shady Grove). 
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order to succeed on a claim).158 In these cases, courts have held that 
requiring a plaintiff to proceed in federal court would illegitimately 
abridge, enlarge, or modify a substantive state law right, and 
“federal rules cannot displace a State’s definition of its own rights 
and remedies.”159 
II. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:  
THE CAFA CARVE-OUTS FOR STATE COMPLEX LITIGATION 
The Supreme Court preserved a role for state courts in man-
aging certain complex cases by disallowing removal of certain of 
these cases to federal court under CAFA’s mass action provision.160 
In addition, Congress in CAFA legislatively carved out a role for 
state courts to adjudicate certain complex cases of a purely local 
character. Thus, contrary to the notion that CAFA completely 
federalized class litigation, the statutory scheme recognized a role 
for state courts in resolving local controversies. Congress, then, 
desired to immunize some types of dispute from federal intrusion. 
A. The CAFA Carve-Out Provisions  
for Home State and Purely Local Actions 
Generally, CAFA created new federal diversity jurisdiction for 
class actions.161 Although CAFA created new opportunities for 
defendants to originally file class litigation in federal court or to 
remove class actions from state court, the CAFA statutory scheme 
fashioned three exceptions to removal by which a district court 
could decline to exercise jurisdiction: (1) the home state exception,162 
(2) the local controversy exception,163 and (3) the discretionary 
 
 158. Wilson, 2018 WL 4623539, at *13; see also Delgado, 2017 WL 5201079, at *10. In 
Delgado, the court followed Justice Stevens’ concurring Shady Grove opinion and applied the 
class action bar incorporated in the Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee consumer protection 
laws over Rule 23. The court “conclude[d] that the specific inclusion of a class action bar in 
the Alabama (and Tennessee and Georgia) consumer protection laws evinces a desire by the 
state legislature to limit not only the form of the action but also the remedies available, 
placing those bars squarely within Justice Stevens’ concurrence.” Id. 
 159. Wilson, 2018 WL 4623539, at *13 (quoting Beal ex rel Putnam v. Walgreen Co., 408 
F. App’x 898, 902 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010)). 
 160. See infra notes 169–183 and accompanying discussion. 
 161. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2018). 
 162. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
 163. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A). 
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jurisdiction of district courts.164 These exceptions set forth a 
complicated and confusing array of requirements by which federal 
courts were required to decline removal jurisdiction —or by 
exercise of discretion—were permitted to remand class actions 
originally filed in state court.165 
The home state and local controversy exceptions are 
mandatory; if the statutory criteria are satisfied, then a district court 
must decline jurisdiction and remand a removed class action to 
state court. The home state exception provides that a district court 
shall decline to exercise jurisdiction when “two-thirds or more of 
the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and 
the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action 
was originally filed.”166  
The local controversy exception sets forth a more complicated 
schema of criteria. To come within the local controversy exception, 
more than two-thirds of proposed class members must be citizens 
of the state; at least one defendant must be a citizen of the state; the 
defendant’s conduct needs to have formed a significant basis for 
the claims; the class members’ principal injuries should have 
occurred where the action is filed; and plaintiffs should not have 
filed another class action asserting the same or similar allegations 
during the previous three years.167 
 
 164. Id. § 1332(d)(3). 
 165. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: 
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1527 (2008) (“CAFA’s exceptions, or some of 
them, are numbingly complicated and, as already observed, well calculated to keep lawyers 
and courts busy for years in work that advances the cause of substantive justice not one 
wit.”). 
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B). 
 167. Id. §1332(d)(4)(A). To satisfy the local controversy exception, “(i) a class action” 
must meet the following criteria:  
“(I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes 
in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally 
filed; at least 1 defendant is a defendant— 
(aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff 
class; 
(bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims 
asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and 
(cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; 
and  
(III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related 
conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was 
originally filed; and 
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In addition to the home state and local controversy exceptions, 
CAFA provided federal courts with discretionary authority to 
decline jurisdiction over removed class actions.168 Similar to 
CAFA’s other jurisdictional exceptions, the discretionary criteria 
are cumbersome and unartfully drafted:  
[a] district court may, in the interests of justice and looking at the 
totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction . . . 
over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than 
two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the 
aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the State in 
which the action was originally filed.169  
In evaluating the “totality of the circumstances,” CAFA enumerates 
six factors that a federal court must consider.170 
Not surprisingly, CAFA’s removal provisions engendered a 
raft of appellate litigation, largely centered on issues relating to 
allocation of burdens of proof,171 satisfaction of the amount in 
 
(ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class 
action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any 
of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.”  
Id.  
 168. Id. § 1332(d)(3). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. A federal court must consider these factors: 
“(A) whether the claims asserted involve matters of national or interstate interest; 
(B) whether the claims asserted will be governed by laws of the State in which the 
action was originally filed or by the laws of other States; 
(C) whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid 
Federal jurisdiction; 
(D) whether the action was brought in a forum with a distinct nexus with the class 
members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; 
(E) whether the number of citizens of the State in which the action was originally 
filed in all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than 
the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizenship of the other 
members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial number of States; 
and 
(E) whether, during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or 
more other class actions asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same 
or other persons have been filed.”  
Id. 
 171. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of 
Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2008) (discussing controversies over allocation of 
burdens of proof in CAFA removal exceptions); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of 
Jurisdictional Proof, 59 ALA. L. REV. 409 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s allocation and shifting of 
burdens of proof for removal jurisdiction). 
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controversy requirements,172 artful drafting to evade removal,173 
the definition of citizenship,174 the definition of the primary or 
significant defendant,175 and other issues.176 However, notwith-
standing the myriad problems engendered by CAFA’s complicated 
home state and local controversy removal exceptions, federal 
courts have declined their jurisdiction and remanded class 
litigation to originating state courts. 
Class litigation engendered by the events surrounding 
Hurricane Katrina illustrate how federal courts, applying CAFA 
exceptions, may remand litigation to state court.177 In the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans, class representative 
Preston filed a class action in Civil District Court for the Parish of 
Orleans, a state court. The action was brought on behalf of patients 
and relatives of deceased patients against Tenet Health Systems 
Memorial Medical Center and LifeCare Management Services LLC. 
Preston alleged that Memorial, the owner and operator of the 
hospital, acted negligently in failing to design and maintain the 
premises in a manner to avoid power loss in the hospital building. 
Preston asserted claims for intentional misconduct, reverse patient 
dumping, and involuntary euthanization. In addition, the petition 
alleged that Memorial and LifeCare failed to develop and 
implement an evacuation plan for its patients. Because the 
 
 172. See generally Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) 
(CAFA removal petition need not include evidentiary support for amount-in-controversy 
allegations); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013) (stipulation to amount-in-
controversy could not bind class members for purpose of CAFA jurisdiction). 
 173. See generally Marc S. Werner, Note, The Viability and Strategic Significance of Class 
Action Alternatives Under CAFA’s Mass Action Provisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 465, 468–96 (2015) 
(discussing artful pleading under CAFA). 
 174. See generally Tim Barham, Note, Class Action Water Crisis: Resolving Flint’s New Split 
Over CAFA’s Local Controversy Exception, 70 BAYLOR L. REV. 149 (2018) (discussing Sixth 
Circuit’s decision allowing for presumed citizenship of class members in state where action 
brought). 
 175. See generally Amanda Coney, Comment, Defining “Primary Defendants” in the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 67 LA. L. REV. 903 (2007) (discussing problems in defining primary 
or significant defendant for CAFA jurisdiction). 
 176. See generally Gina M. Intrepido, Notice Expertise May Help Resolve CAFA Removal 
Issues, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 759 (2005) (discussing practical problems of identifying 
class members’ citizenship for purposes of removal requirements and use of experts to 
resolve this issue). 
 177. See Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 
2007) (affirming district court’s order remanding class litigation to Louisiana state court). 
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defendants failed to timely evacuate the facility after Hurricane 
Katrina, this led to the death and injuries of hospital patients.178 
LifeCare filed a notice of removal, but Memorial never 
consented to the removal. After removal to the Federal District 
Court for Louisiana, Preston moved to remand the litigation under 
CAFA’s local controversy exception. The district court granted 
Preston’s remand petition under CAFA’s local controversy 
exception, home state exception, and the discretionary jurisdiction 
provision.179 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
application of the CAFA removal exceptions.180 The court indicated 
that “Congress crafted CAFA to exclude” from removal “only a 
narrow category of truly localized controversies.”181 To this end, 
CAFA provided district courts with the ability to ferret out the 
“controversy that uniquely affects a particular locality to the 
exclusion of all others.”182 The court concluded that the Hurricane 
Katrina litigation “symbolizes a quintessential example of 
Congress’ intent to carve-out exceptions to CAFA’s expansive grant 
of federal jurisdiction when our courts confront a truly localized 
controversy.”183 
The court noted that CAFA’s discretionary jurisdiction 
provision provided a particularly well-suited framework affecting 
the jurisdictional issue. The court enumerated the ways in which 
the litigation especially fit within the requirements for 
discretionary remand: (1) a nexus existed between the Louisiana 
forum, the defendants, and the proposed class, (2) the defendants 
were citizens of Louisiana, (3) the plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants committed acts in Louisiana that caused injuries and deaths 
to patients hospitalized in New Orleans, Louisiana, and (4) the 
claims involved negligence governed by state law.184 In addition, 
Memorial did not challenge that the lawsuit fulfilled the general 
requirements for CAFA removal, that is, that the class contained 
the requisite number of class members, there was minimal diversity 
 
 178. Id. at 808. 
 179. Id. at 808–09. 
 180. Id. at 808. 
 181. Id. at 812. 
 182. Id. (citing Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 449 F.3d 1159, 1164 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 183. Id. at 823. 
 184. Id. at 812. 
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between plaintiffs and defendants, and the proposed action satisfied 
the aggregate amount in controversy.185 
Instead, Memorial challenged the requirement that greater than 
one-third of the putative class members were Louisiana citizens at 
the time of Preston’s filing the class petition. Memorial argued that 
failing to satisfy that citizenship requirement, the action was 
ineligible for discretionary remand to state court.186 Establishing the 
putative citizenship of the class members in the wake of the 
hurricane proved to be a difficult enterprise, compounded by lost 
records and dispersion of claimants to other states.187 Nonetheless, 
after a lengthy discursive analysis of the legal standards relating to 
citizenship and evidentiary proof, the appellate court concluded 
that based on the record as a whole, the district court made a 
reasonable assumption that at least one-third of the class members 
were Louisiana citizens at the time of filing of the lawsuit.188 
After addressing and rejecting Memorial’s challenges to the 
citizenship, composition, and size of the proposed class, the 
appellate court upheld the remand based on an analysis of the 
statutory factors for determining whether remand was in the 
interest of justice.189 The court concluded that the litigation did not 
affect national interest as contemplated by CAFA; the majority of 
claims were governed by Louisiana law; and there was a distinct 
nexus between the Louisiana forum and the class members, the 
alleged harm, and the defendants.190 The court further found that, 
based on its citizenship analysis, the “number of citizens of the State 
in which the action was originally filed . . . is substantially larger 
than the number of citizens from any other State, and the citizen-
ship of the other members of the proposed class is dispersed among 
a substantial number of States.”191 Finally, the court noted that the 
record did not indicate that the plaintiffs had intentionally pleaded 
the case to avoid federal jurisdiction, and the defendants did not 
assert such an objection.192 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 812–20. 
 188. Id. at 818. 
 189. Id. at 822–23. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 823 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(E)(3) (2018)). 
 192. Id. at 822–23. 
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Similar to the citizenship challenge that defendants raised in the 
Hurricane Katrina litigation, the problem of defining citizenship for 
application of the CAFA exceptions has vexed the federal courts. 
All three of the CAFA exceptions involve a determination of a state 
class member’s citizenship. Courts generally agree that the party 
seeking remand to state court carries the burden of proving a CAFA 
exception.193 In addition, most courts have agreed that the 
definition of “citizenship” for CAFA purposes is the same as it is 
for diversity jurisdiction purposes, meaning a person’s domicile 
with an intent to remain.194 
Federal courts that have applied a strict understanding of 
citizenship in the context of the CAFA exceptions have impeded the 
ability of plaintiffs to keep certain class litigation in state forums. 
The problem of establishing citizenship for CAFA purposes is 
especially problematic in litigation where evidentiary proof is 
difficult or impossible to obtain, as the Hurricane Katrina litigation 
illustrated. Nonetheless, some federal courts have departed from 
this narrow interpretation of citizenship requirements and instead 
have permitted remand based on a presumption of residency and 
domicile.195 
Thus, at least some federal courts have liberally construed the 
requirements of CAFA’s local controversy exception to mandate 
remand to state court.196 The Sixth Circuit upheld remand of class 
litigation brought on behalf of residents and property owners in 
Flint, Michigan, relating to contamination of their water supply. 
The plaintiffs alleged professional negligence against Lockwood, 
Andrews, & Newman, Inc. of Texas and its Michigan affiliate, 
Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C. (Lockwood Michigan), the 
civil engineering firms the city engaged to rehabilitate and provide 
quality control to Flint’s water supply.197 The plaintiffs alleged that 
the defendants knew the water treatment facility needed upgrades 
for lead contamination treatment, yet they did not ensure that the 
 
 193. See, e.g., Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews, & Newman, P.C., 842 F.3d 383, 388–89 (6th 
Cir. 2016). 
 194. E.g., id. at 389–90 (reasoning that citizenship is co-extensive with a person’s domicile). 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. (affirming district court decision to presume class citizenship based on 
residency). See generally Barham, supra note 174 (discussing the Flint, Michigan, water 
contamination litigation). 
 197. Mason, 842 F.3d at 386, 388. 
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proper safeguards were in place—a failure that caused widespread 
personal injuries and property damage due to the contaminated 
water supply.198 
The defendants removed the litigation to federal court, and in 
response, the plaintiffs asserted that the district court was obligated 
to decline jurisdiction under CAFA’s local controversy exception.199 
The district court granted the motion to remand. On appeal, the 
issue before the court was whether the local controversy exception 
was properly applied.200 The defendants contended that two of the 
local controversy exception’s requirements were not met: (1) that 
Lockwood Michigan was not a defendant whose conduct formed a 
significant basis for the claims alleged by the plaintiffs, and (2) that 
plaintiffs had not produced evidence establishing that greater than 
two-thirds of the proposed class were citizens of Michigan.201 
The appellate court affirmed the remand, applying a 
presumption of residency that satisfied the local controversy 
citizenship requirement. Although virtually all federal courts have 
rejected a residency-domicile presumption in the context of the 
local controversy exception, the Sixth Circuit permitted the 
presumption for two reasons: (1) CAFA’s local controversy 
exception was not jurisdictional, and (2) the residency-domicile 
presumption applied because of the difficulties in proving the 
domicile of a mass of individuals.202 
In the context of judicial restrictive rulings, it is difficult to 
assess the efficacy of CAFA’s home state and local controversy 
exceptions as a means of preserving the domain of state courts to 
adjudicate class litigation. Nevertheless, some federal courts 
apparently have eschewed formalism in favor of a holistic view of 
the essential nature of complex disputes, as well as the practical 
difficulties plaintiffs face in carrying burdens of proof on CAFA 
removal, especially regarding the citizenship of class members. In 
so doing, these courts have conserved a role for state courts to 
maintain jurisdiction over class litigation originally filed there. 
 
 198. Id. at 388. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 392. 
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III. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:  
PRESERVING THE ROLE OF STATES’ ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Federal courts have vacillated in their approach to dual-system 
complex litigation based on their varying interpretations of 
abstention doctrines, the Anti-Injunction Act, and Erie principles. 
In the context of this otherwise muddled landscape, the Supreme 
Court effectively bolstered the state role in protecting citizens 
involved in aggregate litigation by preserving state parens patriae 
actions from removal to federal court.203 If Congress intended to 
federalize class action litigation post-CAFA, then the Court carved 
out a distinct role for state attorneys general in pursuing aggregate 
relief in state forums, notwithstanding CAFA. 
The enactment of CAFA set the stage for conflict between 
federal and state jurisdiction over parens patriae actions by creating 
a removal opportunity for “mass actions.”204 CAFA defined a mass 
action as any civil action “in which monetary relief claims of 100 or 
more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that 
the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.”205 
CAFA created new minimal diversity jurisdiction for class and 
mass actions in which the aggregate amount in controversy 
exceeded $5 million.206 However, unlike a class action, a federal 
court could exert jurisdiction in a mass action only over those 
plaintiffs whose claims individually satisfied the $75,000 amount-
in-controversy requirement.207 Through artful pleading then, 
plaintiffs could successfully keep aggregate litigation in state court 
by pleading that individual claims amounted to less than $75,000. 
CAFA’s creation of new federal jurisdiction for “mass actions” 
was driven by the same policy considerations that animated 
enactment of CAFA: defendants’ desire to avoid large-scale 
aggregate litigation in plaintiff-favoring state forums.208 The 
 
 203. See generally Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161 (2014). 
 204. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(11)(A)–(B)(i) (2018) (mass action removable under 
§§ 1332(d)(2)–(10), 1453). 
 205. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
 206. Id. § 1332(d)(2), (6), (11)(A). 
 207. Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). 
 208. See Werner, supra note 173, at 471 (noting fears of CAFA’s proponents that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys could subvert CAFA’s goals by bringing aggregate lawsuits through 
joinder rules or other procedural alternatives, thus circumventing federal jurisdiction; noting 
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defense bar recognized that creating removal jurisdiction for state-
based class actions would not completely address the problems 
members of the defense bar faced in state court because plaintiffs 
could evade removal simply by joining numerous claimants in an 
action that was not denominated as a class action.209 In addition, 
defendants were vulnerable to aggregate litigation in state courts 
that lacked class action rules, such as Mississippi, but nonetheless 
permitted large-scale joinder of parties.210 From the defense 
perspective, a mass action was functionally the equivalent of a class 
action: if a mass action walked like a class action duck and quacked 
like a class action duck, then it was a class action duck.211 
CAFA’s mass action provision swiftly created tension with state 
parens patriae actions, wherein state attorneys general brought 
actions representing the interests of groups of citizens. In response 
to parens patriae actions, defendants sought removal under CAFA’s 
mass action provisions, contending that state parens patriae actions 
satisfied CAFA’s mass action requirements and were simply class 
actions in disguise. The CAFA challenges to removal of state parens 
patriae actions engendered a split among federal authorities. The 
Fifth Circuit held that parens patriae actions were mass actions 
subject to removal,212 while the Second,213 Fourth,214 Seventh,215 and 
Ninth Circuits216 held that parens patriae actions had only one 
plaintiff—the state—and therefore fell short of the mass action 
requirement of at least 100 claimants.217 Resolving this conflict, the 
Court in 2014 rejected the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion and agreed 
with the majority of federal courts that state parens patriae actions 
were not CAFA mass actions subject to removal.218 
 
the particular threat raised by lenient Mississippi rules permitting joinder of large numbers 
of claimants in absence of a state class action rule). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See 151 CONG. REC. 1641–42 (2005) (statement of Sen. Lott) (suggesting that mass 
actions are class actions in disguise and should be subject to removal the same as class actions). 
 212. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins., 536 F.3d 418, 430, 432 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(relying on CAFA’s overarching purpose in extending federal court jurisdiction and 
removing class action look-alikes). 
 213. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Kentucky, 704 F.3d 208, 219–20 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 214. AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 215. LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 772–74 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 216. Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 670–72 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 217. Id. at 672. 
 218. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 176 (2014). 
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A. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics:  
Saving State Parens Patriae Actions 
The Hood parens patriae litigation arose in Mississippi, one of the 
few states lacking a class action rule. The Mississippi Attorney 
General brought a parens patriae lawsuit on behalf of Mississippi 
citizens who purchased liquid crystal display panels from 
manufacturers, sellers, and distributors of these panels. The state 
AG alleged that the defendants engaged in a price-fixing scheme in 
violation of the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act and the 
Mississippi Antitrust Act.219 The AG sought injunctive relief, civil 
penalties, attorney’s fees, and restitution for its own purchases of 
LCD products and for the purchases of its citizens.220 
The defendants filed a notice of removal, arguing that the AG’s 
action was either a class action or a mass action subject to CAFA 
removal. The district court first held that the AG’s action did not 
qualify as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 
However, relying on Fifth Circuit precedent,221 the court held that 
the AG’s action qualified as a mass action because it was a civil 
action in which monetary claims of 100 or more persons were 
proposed to be tried jointly on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ 
claims involved common questions of law or fact.222 The Fifth 
Circuit agreed that under its Caldwell precedent, the Mississippi 
AG’s action qualified as a mass action subject to removal.223 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed, 
applying a statutory construction analysis to CAFA’s text.224 The 
 
 219. Id. at 166. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins., 536 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 222. CAFA defines a mass action as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief 
claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the 
plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) 
(2018). In addition, CAFA specifies that federal jurisdiction over mass actions shall exist only 
over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount 
requirement of $75,000. Id. 
 223. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796, 799–800 (5th Cir. 
2012), rev’d, 571 U.S. 161 (2014). A concurring judge noted that after the Fifth Circuit’s Caldwell 
decision, three other appellate courts had concluded that similar state AG parens patriae actions 
were not mass actions suitable for removal under CAFA. Id. at 805 (Elrod, J., concurring). 
 224. Hood, 571 U.S. at 161–68. The Court stated that the issue presented on appeal “is 
whether a suit filed by a State as the sole plaintiff constitutes a ‘mass action’ under CAFA 
where it includes a claim for restitution based on injuries suffered by the State’s citizens.” Id. 
at 164. 
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Court held that because the State of Mississippi was the only named 
plaintiff in the action, the case was not a mass action as defined by 
CAFA’s plain text.225 The Court rejected the defendants’ contention 
that CAFA’s mass action provision referred to the number of real 
parties in interest to the claims, regardless of whether those persons 
are named or unnamed. Instead, the Court pointed out that in 
defining what type of litigation constituted a mass action, the 
statute stated “100 or more persons,” and not “100 or more named 
or unnamed real parties in interest.”226 In addition, CAFA’s text 
supplied additional support by referring to “plaintiffs” as the 
parties who were proposed to join their claims in a single trial.227 
The defendants offered no reason to believe that Congress intended 
to extend the real party in interest inquiry to CAFA’s jurisdictional 
requirements.228 
The Court concluded that the term “plaintiff” was “among the 
most commonly understood of legal terms of art: It means a ‘party 
who brings a civil suit in a court of law.’”229 It did not mean any 
named or unnamed person whom a lawsuit might benefit. 
Construing legislative intent in enacting CAFA, the Court noted 
that Congress focused on persons who were actually proposing to 
join together as named plaintiffs. Thus, “[r]equiring district courts 
to pierce the pleadings to identify unnamed persons interested in 
the suit would run afoul of that intent.”230 
The Court also rejected, as administratively unfeasible, the 
notion that a federal district court would be tasked with identifying 
claimants in the mass action whose claims were for less than 
$75,000.231 Even assuming that it was possible to sever such persons 
and remand their claims to state court, “much of the State’s lawsuit 
could proceed in state court after all, simultaneously with the 
newly severed parallel federal action.”232 
 
 225. Id. at 164. 
 226. Id. at 169. 
 227. Id. at 169–72. 
 228. Id. at 173–75. 
 229. Id. at 170. 
 230. Id. at 176. 
 231. Id. at 171–72 (indicating that this requirement raised the prospect of an 
administrative “nightmare” for federal courts to ascertain, based on evidentiary hearings, 
which claims were worth more or less than the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold for federal 
adjudication). 
 232. Id. at 172. 
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Hood was a clear victory for state attorneys general in their 
capacity to pursue aggregate litigation in state court, free from 
federal interference by way of removal under CAFA’s mass action 
provisions.233 Indeed, as one scholar noted, an impressive forty-six 
state AGs filed amici briefs in Hood urging the Court to narrowly 
construe CAFA’s mass action provision in order to retain state 
jurisdiction over complex litigation.234 More expansively, 
commentators have suggested that the Hood decision is a victory for 
consumers and likely to encourage more parens patriae actions, in 
some instances with state AGs partnering with private plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to resolve these complex cases.235 
B. The Role of State Attorneys General  
in Reviewing Federal Class Settlements 
While the Court in Hood narrowly interpreted CAFA’s mass 
action provision to preserve a role for state AG parens patriae 
actions, the CAFA statute explicitly recognizes a role for state AG 
participation in reviewing federal class action settlements.236 This 
state AG participation is effectuated through a CAFA provision 
that requires settling defendants to notify appropriate federal and 
state officials of the pending federal class action settlement. The 
relevant federal official is the U.S. Attorney General. The relevant 
state officials are those who have “primary regulatory or 
supervisory responsibility with respect to the defendant, or who 
 
 233. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: 
A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 320 (2014) (commenting favorably on Hood as 
relatively unencumbered means for state attorneys general to hold defendants accountable 
for injuries to state citizens); Thomas, supra note 25, at 763 (stating that the Court recognized 
the role of state courts in adjudicating mass tort litigation and that the decision “seems likely 
to accelerate the rise of parens patriae suits as an alternative to class actions”); Patrick 
Hayden, Comment, Parens Patriae, the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Path Forward: The 
Implications of Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 124 YALE L.J. 563, 564 (2014) 
(suggesting that the Court’s decision in Hood signaled “an apparent tolerance of litigation 
strategies designed to maneuver around CAFA and resist removal to federal court”). 
 234. Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805, 
1810 (2018). 
 235. Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class 
Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 524 (2014) (noting impact for consumers and fact that private 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are frequently hired to assist state attorneys general in prosecuting 
consumer class litigation in state AG proceedings). 
 236. 28 U.S.C. § 1715 (2018). See generally Sharkey, supra note 16 (discussing CAFA 
notice provision history and impact). 
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licenses or otherwise authorizes the defendant to conduct business 
in the State,” or, by default, the attorney general of any state in 
which any class member lives.237 
Whether a CAFA notice is sent to state officials depends on if a 
proposed settlement impacts its citizens and not on the state’s 
membership in the class. The CAFA notice requirement is triggered 
when parties to a federal class action have filed a proposed 
settlement, which a federal judge must approve in a fairness 
hearing.238 Prior to receiving approval for the proposed settlement, 
defense counsel must inform the court of its compliance with the 
CAFA notice provisions by showing that the defendant has 
provided notice to the appropriate official of every state in which 
class members reside.239 Appropriate notice to state officials 
includes copies of the complaint, class notice, proposed settlement, 
and other pertinent materials.240  
The CAFA notice provision is “intended to give states a role in 
ensuring that [their] citizens are equitably compensated in class 
action settlements.”241 Congress intended the CAFA notice 
requirement to enable states to safeguard their citizens’ interests, 
rather than their own. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report for 
CAFA indicates that the notice requirement “provides an 
additional mechanism to safeguard plaintiff class members’ rights 
by requiring that notice of class action settlements be sent to 
appropriate state and federal officials, so that they may voice 
concerns if they believe that the class action settlement is not in the 
best interest of their citizens.”242  
A judge’s order giving final approval of a proposed settlement 
may not be issued until ninety days after appropriate notification 
 
 237. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(a)(2). 
 238. Id. § 1715(b). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. § 1715 (b)(1)–(8). 
 241. California v. Intelligender, L.L.C., 771 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2014); see id. at 1172 
(“CAFA expressly provides that the defendant in a class action must provide notice to the 
appropriate state official of any proposed settlement, presumably so that the state may 
comment upon or object to the settlement’s approval, if the State believes the terms 
inadequately protect state citizens.”). 
 242. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6; see also id. at 35 
(“[N]otifying appropriate state and federal officials of proposed class action settlements will 
provide a check against inequitable settlements in these cases.”). 
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to state and federal officials,243 which provides officials time to act 
if they wish to respond with comments or objections to the 
proposed settlement.244 If a defendant fails to comply with the 
notice provision, a class member can choose not to be bound by the 
settlement agreement.245 In response to CAFA notification of 
pending federal settlements, state officials may file objections to the 
settlements246 or choose to file public lawsuits on their own.247 
Although there are reported instances where state officials have 
filed objections to federal class action settlements or filed reactive 
class litigation based on the same claims, the overwhelming 
majority of cases indicate that federal and state officials rarely 
comment or object to pending federal class settlements.248 This 
raises the question of whether the CAFA notice provision is little 
more than a paper tiger, particularly in effectuating congressional 
intent to protect state citizens’ interests in class action settlements. 
The reasons for this apparent state lassitude in commenting on or 
objecting to federal class action settlements remain unexplored. 
Nonetheless, there is statutory authority for state officials to engage 
in the federal class action arena to protect state interest. 
IV. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:  
SECURITIES CLASS LITIGATION UNDER SLUSA 
The Court recently preserved states’ ability to adjudicate class 
actions alleging only securities violations of the 1933 Securities 
Act,249 reaffirming the capacity of state courts to resolve federal 
 
 243. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(d). 
 244. See, e.g., Harrison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 5:13-cv-01180-BLF, 2018 
WL 5292057, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2018) (finding CAFA notice properly provided to 
federal and state officials and no comments or objections to proposed settlement received  
by court). 
 245. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(e)(1); see In re Flonase Antitrust Litig., No. 08-3301, 2015 WL 
9273274, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2015) (finding Louisiana’s receipt of the CAFA Notice 
insufficient to unequivocally demonstrate that the State was aware that it was a class member 
and voluntarily chose to have its claims resolved by the Settlement Agreement). 
 246. Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 411, 
449 (2018) (citing Response Brief Amicus Curiae of the Attorneys General of Alaska et al. in 
Opposition to the Proposed Second Amended Settlement Agreement and Release, Figueroa 
v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (No. 05-21251-CIV)). 
 247. Id. (discussing California v. IntelliGender, L.L.C., 771 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
 248. Westlaw search federal case database, search “CAFA notice” w/75 “1715.” 
 249. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018). 
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claims.250 In so holding, the Court resolved and clarified a long-
simmering controversy concerning the jurisdictional provisions of 
the 1933 Securities Act, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995 (PSLRA),251 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998 (SLUSA).252 The Court unanimously held that SLUSA 
did not strip state courts of their longstanding jurisdiction to 
adjudicate class actions alleging only 1933 Act violations and did 
not authorize removing such suits from state to federal court.253 
The controversy concerning whether states are the appropriate 
forum for adjudicating securities class action arose as a 
consequence of a complicated, intersecting set of statutes governing 
securities litigation. Congress enacted the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in response to perceived abuses of 
securities class action lawsuits. The PSLRA instituted numerous 
substantive and procedural reforms of securities litigation.254 
Congress’s intention in enacting the PSLRA was to federalize 
securities class litigation and to tighten up the requirements for 
pursuing such litigation255 as well as limiting remedies available in 
these cases. As such, enactment of the PSLRA was part of the class 
action reform efforts sought by corporate defense interests and 
paralleled the restrictive federal class action jurisprudence 
emerging in the mid-1990s. 
 
 250. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018). 
 251. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 252. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2018)). See generally Mitchell A. Lowenthal & 
Shiwon Choe, State Courts Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Securities Act Class Actions, but the Frequent 
Failure to Ask the Right Question Too Often Produces the Wrong Answer, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 739 
(2015) (describing the conflict among federal courts concerning whether federal securities 
class actions can proceed in state court or must be adjudicated in federal court); Steven J. 
Roeder, The Seventh Circuit Widens a Split Among the Circuits on SLUSA Preemption of State 
Class Actions, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 2018, at 1, 1 (“SLUSA bars state law breach of contract and 
breach of fiduciary duty class actions that look much different than the standard securities 
cases SLUSA was intended to preempt and prevent.”); Trevor M. Cutaiar, Comment, Are 
Securities Act of 1933 Claims Filed in State Court Removable Under the Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005? A Proposed Resolution to a Statutory Conflict, 55 LOY. L. REV. 559 (2009) (discussing 
conflict between CAFA removal provision and non-removable provision of the Securities 
Act). 
 253. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1078. 
 254. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006). 
 255. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067. 
005.MULLENIX_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/20  11:17 AM 
1551 States in an Era of Federalized Class Actions 
 1599 
 
In reaction, and to evade the various PSLRA reforms, many 
plaintiffs subsequently shifted their securities class litigation from 
federal to state courts.256 In 1998, Congress amended the PSLRA 
with enactment of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998. The general purpose of the SLUSA was to address the 
unintended consequence of the PSLRA,257 and to stem the shift 
from federal to state courts. SLUSA was aimed at requiring that 
significant securities class actions be litigated in federal court, 
subject to the requirements of the PSLRA.258 
After Congressional enactment of SLUSA, federal courts issued 
conflicting decisions concerning whether securities litigation could 
proceed in state court or were required to be adjudicated in federal 
court.259 The debate centered on whether cases alleging 
“exclusively federal securities class action claims” under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and that contained no pendent state law 
claims could proceed in state court or were required to be litigated 
in federal court. Generally, courts agreed that state court class 
actions that alleged both Securities Act claims and state law claims 
should proceed in federal court. But federal courts divided over 
whether exclusively federal securities class actions that 
alleged no state law claims could proceed in state court (where 
these class actions would not be subject to the PSLRA’s 
requirements) or whether they could only proceed in federal court 
(where they would be subject to the PSLRA’s requirements).260 
 
 256. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82. 
 257. Id.; see also Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1067. 
 258. See : Hearing on S. 1260 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. 
& Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm, Chairman, Subcomm. 
on Sec. of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) (“We held a hearing earlier this year 
to take a look at how the [PSLRA] was being received and how it was working. We 
discovered from that hearing that a new loophole was being exploited, that what was 
occurring is that there has been a shift of these lawsuits into State courts. So Senator Dodd 
and I thought about this, looked at it, and decided to introduce a bill that basically says that 
for class action suits, and class action suits only, where you are dealing with a stock that is 
traded nationally, so there is clearly an overriding national interest, that those suits have to 
be filed in Federal court.”). 
 259. See Lowenthal & Choe, supra note 252, at 742–43 nn.6–8 (cataloging the conflicting 
trial and appellate decisions on whether SLUSA permitted or prohibited removal of state-
initiated securities class litigation). 
 260. Id. 
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In 2018, the Supreme Court resolved this debate in Cyan, Inc. v. 
Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund.261 Cyan, a 
telecommunications company, involved a stereotypical securities 
class action litigation. Three pension funds and an individual 
investor purchased Cyan stock shares in an initial public offering. 
When their shares declined in value, the investors brought a class 
action lawsuit in California Superior Court. Their complaint 
alleged that Cyan’s offering documents contained material 
misstatements, in violation of the Securities Act of 1933, and did not 
assert any state-based claims.262 
Cyan moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Cyan contended that SLUSA stripped state courts of 
the power to adjudicate 1933 Act claims in “covered class actions.” 
In response, the plaintiffs argued that SLUSA left intact state court 
jurisdiction over all lawsuits, including “covered class actions” that 
alleged only 1933 Act claims. The California Superior Court agreed 
with the plaintiffs and state appellate courts denied review of that 
ruling.263 
On appeal, the Supreme Court sought to bring conceptual order 
among the multiple statutory provisions relating to federal and 
state court jurisdiction over securities class litigation, engaging in 
an exhaustive exercise of statutory construction. First, the Court 
noted that in enacting the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, 
Congress created private rights of action for securities violations, 
authorizing concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over such 
lawsuits,264 and barred removal of securities actions from state to 
federal court.265 In the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—which 
related not to the issuance of stock, but to its subsequent trading—
Congress provided exclusive jurisdiction over securities violations 
in federal court. Thus, a plaintiff could not go to state court to 
litigate a 1934 claim.266 In 1995, the PSLRA made substantive and 
procedural changes to the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which applied in 
state and federal courts.267 
 
 261. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1078. 
 262. Id. at 1068. 
 263. Id. at 1061. 
 264. Id. at 1066 (citing Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 86). 
 265. Id. (citing Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 87). 
 266. Id. at 1066 (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 902–03). 
 267. Id. at 1066–67. 
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The Court noted that Congress’s enactment of SLUSA was 
intended to remedy the unintended consequence of plaintiffs 
pursuing security class litigation in state court. Turning to the issue 
presented by SLUSA, the Court first addressed the SLUSA 
prohibition of security “covered class actions” based on state law.268 
The Court noted that according to SLUSA’s definitions, a “covered 
class action” embraced a class action where damages were sought 
on behalf of more than fifty persons.269 Second, the Court concluded 
that SLUSA completely disallowed, in both state and federal courts, 
sizable class actions that were founded on state law and alleged 
dishonest practices respecting a nationally traded security’s 
purchase or sale.270 Third, the Court concluded that any such covered 
actions removed to federal court were subject to dismissal.271 
Nonetheless, the Court determined that two additional SLUSA 
conforming amendments272 did nothing to deprive state court 
jurisdiction to decide class actions brought under the 1933 Act, and 
therefore state court jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims “continues 
undisturbed.”273 Construing SLUSA’s various limitations and 
conforming amendments, the Court concluded that SLUSA barred 
certain securities class actions based on state law, and authorized 
removal of those actions to be dismissed by a federal court. “But 
the section says nothing, and so does nothing, to deprive state 
courts of jurisdiction over class actions based on federal law.”274 
Moreover, the Court rejected Cyan’s attempt to bar state court 
jurisdiction based on SLUSA’s legislative history.275 The Court 
pointed out that federal 1933 Act claims litigated in state courts 
would necessarily have to apply the PSLRA’s substantive reforms.276 
Summarizing its statutory scorecard, the Court indicated that 
pursuant to its reading of SLUSA: (1) all covered class actions must 
proceed under federal law, (2) most (i.e., those alleging 1934 Act 
claims) must proceed in federal court, and (3) some (i.e., those 
 
 268. Id. at 1067 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2018)). 
 269. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2)). 
 270. Id. at 1067–68 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)). 
 271. Id. at 1068. 
 272. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). 
 273. Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1069. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 1072–73 (even assuming clear text can ever give way to purpose, Cyan would 
need some monster arguments on this score to create doubts about SLUSA’s meaning). 
 276. Id. at 1073. 
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alleging 1933 Act claims) may proceed in state court.277 The Court 
declined to speculate why Congress declined to require 1933 Act 
class actions be brought in federal courts: “[P]erhaps it was because 
of the long and unusually pronounced tradition of according 
authority to state courts over 1933 Act litigation.”278 Finally, the 
Court rejected the Government’s reading of SLUSA that would 
permit removal of 1933 Act class litigation to federal court. The 
Court concluded that under the SLUSA statutory scheme, only 
state-law class actions alleging security misconduct were subject to 
removal. Conversely, federal lawsuits alleging only 1933 Act claims 
remain subject to the 1933 Act’s ban on removal.279 
The Court’s Cyan decision is noteworthy for several reasons. 
Significantly, it evidences yet another recent Court decision 
reaffirming state court authority to adjudicate class action claims, 
free from federal intrusion by way of removal jurisdiction. 
Although the Court indicated that the 1933 Act claims, as tried in 
state court, would be subject to federal PSLRA standards, the Cyan 
decision nonetheless represented a victory for plaintiffs seeking to 
vindicate their class rights in a state rather than a federal forum. 
Moreover—similar to the Bayer and Hood decisions—a unanimous 
Court agreed on the Cyan holdings and results. The Court’s 
unanimity in giving deference to state forums, in this cluster of 
cases, belies the prevalent narrative of a conservative, pro-
corporate Court lacking sympathy for class action plaintiffs. None 
of the Justices dissented or offered fractured concurring opinions; 
all approved state courts as appropriate jurisdictions to resolve 
mass claims. Notably, the defendants in Bayer, Hood, and Cyan all 
lost their appeals to retain their class action advantage of their 
forum-shopping in the federal arena. 
V. KEEPING COMPLEX LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS:  
DEFENDANT CLASS ACTION COUNTERCLAIMS 
A. The Problem of the Defendant Counterclaim Class Action 
In a procedural complication that perhaps only procedural 
wonks could appreciate, yet another means for retaining state 
 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 1075–78. 
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jurisdiction over class litigation arises when a defendant asserts a 
class counterclaim in state court.280 This interesting situation arises 
in the following scenario: a plaintiff files an individual lawsuit 
against a defendant in state court, and the defendant responds by 
asserting a class action counterclaim against the plaintiff. In this 
setting, may the subject of the counterclaim remove the case to 
federal court under CAFA, or may the state court retain jurisdiction 
over the counterclaim class action?281 
Federal removal jurisdiction refers to a defendant’s right to 
remove a case from state court to federal court when a plaintiff sues 
the defendant in state court.282 The defendant’s right of removal is 
a longstanding right, traceable to principles of federalism embedded 
in the American dual court system. The defendant’s right of 
removal respects both a plaintiff’s original choice of forum 
counterbalanced by a defendant’s right to a neutral, non-biased 
forum. 
A defendant may remove a case from state to federal court 
provided that the defendant can demonstrate a valid basis for 
federal court jurisdiction, either in the court’s federal question or 
diversity jurisdiction. Removal is governed by a statutory scheme. 
The general removal statute—28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)—provides that 
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by 
the defendant or the defendants, to the [appropriate] district court 
of the United States.”283 
A defendant may remove a state case within a federal court’s 
diversity jurisdiction only if no defendant is a citizen of the state in 
which the plaintiff brought the action.284 This limitation derives 
 
 280. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Finding Room for State Class Actions in a Post-CAFA 
World: The Case of the Counterclaim Class Action, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 193 (2007) (definitive 
article on the possibility of state defendant counterclaim class actions). Tidmarsh concludes 
that defendant class action counterclaims should not be removable under CAFA, thereby 
ensuring “some wading room for state courts to contribute to the development of the law of 
class actions.” Id. at 196. 
 281. See generally Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019). A portion 
of the following discussion and analysis is derived from Linda S. Mullenix, Just Who Is a 
Defendant? Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants’ Removal Rights Under CAFA, PREVIEW U.S. 
SUP. CT. CASES, Jan. 7, 2019, at 33. 
 282. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2018). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. § 1441(b)(2). 
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from the underlying rationale for diversity jurisdiction, which is to 
protect a defendant from in-state bias. Therefore, if a defendant is a 
citizen of the state in which the plaintiff sues, the presumed bias 
against out-of-state defendants is not present. In addition, if a state 
lawsuit entails both state and federal claims, the removal statutes 
permit a defendant or defendants to remove the entire case to 
federal court.285 When a plaintiff sues multiple defendants, all the 
defendants must be notified and agree to the removal.286 
Congress provided a special removal provision for state-based 
class actions in CAFA. Pursuant to this provision, any defendant 
sued in a state class action has the right to remove the class action 
to federal court.287 The language of the CAFA removal statute 
differs from the general removal statutes in three significant ways. 
First, the CAFA removal provision allows for removal by “any 
defendant” sued in a state class action, rather than by “the 
defendant or the defendants” authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).288 
Second, in multiple defendant cases, CAFA does not require that 
all the defendants consent to removal to federal court.289 Third, 
CAFA permits removal to federal court even where one or more of 
the defendants is a citizen of the state where the plaintiff sues.290 
Courts generally respect and defer to a plaintiff’s original choice 
of forum. In Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, the Court affirmed 
that removal was a defendant’s right solely, and not a plaintiff’s 
right.291 This common-sense conclusion was based on the fact that 
plaintiffs originally may choose where to bring their lawsuits, and 
if plaintiffs wanted to sue in federal court, they could make that 
choice initially. The purpose behind the removal statute, then, was 
to level the litigation playing field by permitting a defendant sued 
in state court to counterbalance the plaintiff’s choice of forum. In 
addition, the removal statute is intended to address the problem of 
in-state bias against out-of-state defendants sued in state court. 
The Shamrock Oil Court further emphasized that removal was a 
defendant’s right, especially when a defendant might assert a 
 
 285. Id. § 1441(c). 
 286. Id. § 1446(b)(2)(a). 
 287. Id. § 1453(b). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105 (1941). 
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counterclaim against a plaintiff.292 Even though the defendant’s 
counterclaim might present an arguable basis for federal court 
jurisdiction, the Court held that under these circumstances a 
plaintiff sued in the counterclaim could not then remove the case to 
federal court.293 Because the plaintiff originally could choose the 
forum, it made no sense to allow plaintiffs two bites at the apple: to 
sue first in state court and then to change minds and seek removal 
to federal court if a defendant asserted a counterclaim against the 
original plaintiff. 
Since the Court’s Shamrock Oil decision, lower federal courts 
consistently have upheld the doctrine that plaintiffs may not remove 
a case in response to a defendant’s assertion of a counterclaim, which 
is a plain application of the Shamrock Oil holding. However, the 
Shamrock Oil Court was not faced with—and therefore did not 
address—the problem of the removability of a state court case 
when a third-party is impleaded into a lawsuit as a consequence of 
a defendant asserting a counterclaim against this new defendant 
who was never named as a plaintiff or a defendant in the original 
action. This is precisely the problem presented by the appeal in 
Home Depot Inc. v. Jackson that recently came before the Court.294 
For more than 50 years, based on the Shamrock Oil precedent, 
federal courts have refused to permit third-party defendants sued 
in a state court counterclaim to remove the case to federal court. 
And, building on these precedents, the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits have similarly refused to permit a third-party 
counterclaim defendant sued in a class action to remove the case 
under the CAFA removal provision, § 1453(b).295 
The Home Depot litigation illustrates the complexity of the class 
counterclaim removal issue raised in the context of the CAFA. As 
such, the case not only involves the complex interplay of numerous 
statutory provisions but implicates the policy reasons behind 
CAFA’s enactment. A decision refusing to permit a class 
counterclaim to be removed to federal court enhances the 
 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 106–08. 
 294. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019). 
 295. See, e.g., Tri-State Water Treatment, Inc. v. Bauer, 845 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 2017); In re 
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 680 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 2012); Palisades Collections L.L.C. 
v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2008); Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
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independent ability of state courts to adjudicate class litigation, 
which generally will favor the plaintiffs pursing the class litigation. 
In contrast, a decision upholding removal of class action counter-
claims pursuant to CAFA generally will favor the corporate 
defendants subject to such class counterclaims. 
B. Preserving State Court Jurisdiction:  
Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson 
In Home Depot U.S.A v. Jackson, the Court in a 5-4 decision held 
that the general removal statute does not permit removal to federal 
court by a third-party counterclaim defendant who is sued in state 
court.296 The Court’s liberal Justices—clearly favoring the plaintiff’s 
ability to keep its consumer class action case in state court—were 
joined by Justice Thomas to form the prevailing majority.297 The 
Court’s conservative cohort—Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, 
and Chief Justice Roberts—filed a lengthy dissenting opinion 
arguing that CAFA had essentially expanded removal jurisdiction 
to cover the removal situation of a third-party counterclaim 
defendant.298 The dissenters noted that the majority’s decision 
effectively undercut and defeated CAFA’s main underlying policy 
rationale, which is to protect class action defendants against 
unfavorable state court forums. 
1. The problem of the third-party counterclaim defendant 
The underlying facts in Home Depot demonstrate how an 
individual state court action can be transformed by a defendant’s 
class action counterclaim into a battle over forum selection. In June 
2016, Citibank N.A. sued George Jackson in North Carolina state 
court alleging that Jackson failed to pay for a water treatment 
system Jackson purchased using a Citibank credit card.299 Jackson 
purchased the water treatment system from Carolina Water 
Systems, in coordination with Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., which 
provided the water system and arranged for installment. In 
addition, Home Depot arranged for financing by offering Jackson a 
 
 296. See generally Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. 1743. 
 297. Id. at 1745–51. 
 298. Id. at 1751–65. 
 299. Jackson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 880 F.3d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 139 S. 
Ct. 1743 (2019). 
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Home Depot–branded credit card issued by Citibank. Citibank 
serviced the credit card debt.300 
In August 2016, Jackson answered Citibank’s complaint and 
asserted a class action counterclaim against Home Depot and CWS, 
as third-party defendants.301 The putative class consisted of 
approximately 286 people who had purchased water systems from 
Home Depot and CWS in North Carolina. Jackson’s counterclaim 
was grounded in consumer fraud claims under North Carolina 
state law. Jackson alleged that the third-party defendants engaged 
in unfair and deceptive trade practices about the water treatment 
systems, and that Citibank was jointly and severally liable because 
Home Depot sold or assigned the transaction to Citibank.302 In 
September 2016, Citibank voluntarily dismissed its collection 
claims against Jackson, leaving Home Depot and CWS as the only 
third-party defendants to Jackson’s counterclaim.303 
In October 2016, Home Depot filed a notice of removal in the 
federal district court for Western District of North Carolina, under 
CAFA.304 CAFA permits “any defendant” to remove a state class 
action to federal court.305 Home Depot also filed a motion asking 
the federal court to realign the parties and to designate Jackson as 
the plaintiff and Home Depot and CWS as defendants. Jackson then 
filed a motion to remand the case back to North Carolina state court 
and amended his complaint to remove any reference to Citibank.306 
In March 2017, the federal district court denied Home Depot’s 
motion to realign the parties and granted Jackson’s motion to 
remand the case to state court,307 relying on Fourth Circuit 
precedent in Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts.308 The court 
indicated that because Home Depot was not an original defendant 
in Citibank’s collection lawsuit against Jackson, Home Depot did 
not have a right to remove the class action to federal court. 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See Citibank, N.A. v. Jackson, No. 3:16-CV-00712-GCM, 2017 WL 1091367, at *2–4 
(W.D.N.C. Mar. 21, 2017) (citing Palisades Collections L.L.C. v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 
2008)), aff’d, 880 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2018), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019). 
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders.309 
Relying on Shamrock Oil, the appellate court held that removal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) did not permit removal by a defendant to 
a claim asserted as a counterclaim.310 In addition, the court rejected 
Home Depot’s argument that CAFA expanded the class of 
defendants who can remove a case to federal court to include a 
third-party defendant to a counterclaim.311 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress, in enacting CAFA, 
used the well-established meaning of the term “defendant” to 
describe the parties entitled to removal, and this did not include 
removal by parties facing counterclaims.312 The court noted that all 
other circuit courts to consider the issue under CAFA had similarly 
decided that CAFA did not expand the right of removal under these 
circumstances.313 The court also affirmed the district court’s refusal 
to realign the parties, concluding that no party to the litigation was 
attempting to evade limits on diversity jurisdiction.314 
2. Arguments to the Supreme Court 
On appeal, the parties’ arguments to the Supreme Court are 
worth canvassing, in light of how closely the majority and 
dissenting opinions subsequently tracked and adopted those same 
arguments. The issues that confronted the Supreme Court concerned 
how courts should characterize an involuntary third-party 
defendant who is sued in a class action counterclaim in order to 
apply the general removal statute, the CAFA removal provision, 
and the Shamrock Oil holding on non-removable counterclaims. 
Home Depot essentially asked the Court to determine who exactly 
is a defendant for removal purposes. Home Depot contended, as 
against prevailing circuit law, that a third-party class action 
counterclaim defendant was a defendant under the general and 
CAFA removal provisions, and that circuit courts had 
misinterpreted and misapplied the Shamrock Oil holding.315 
 
 309. Jackson, 880 F.3d at 167. 
 310. Id. at 167–68. 
 311. Id. at 168–69. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 169. 
 314. Id. at 170, 172–73. 
 315. Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, 11–12, Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 
1743 (2019) (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 5920364. 
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Home Depot argued that it unquestionably was a defendant in 
the underlying litigation, and that it was involuntarily brought into 
the litigation by the original defendant Jackson when Jackson chose 
to assert a consumer class action counterclaim against Citibank. 
Home Depot pointed out that it never was a plaintiff in the lawsuit. 
Therefore, the Court should not extend the Shamrock Oil original-
plaintiff exception (regarding non-removability of counterclaims) 
to prohibit removal by a third-party counterclaim defendant such 
as itself. Home Depot argued that the Shamrock Oil decision set 
forth a limitation on removability based on an original-plaintiff 
rule, not an original-defendant rule. A third-party defendant to a 
counterclaim “is not a plaintiff under any definition of that word.”316 
Home Depot contended that the text, structure, and history of 
the general removal statutes dictate that a third-party defendant 
that was involuntarily brought into a lawsuit as a consequence of a 
counterclaim was a defendant that should be able to avail itself of 
the general removal provisions. Home Depot pointed to the 
statutory language stating that “a defendant or defendants” may 
remove a state case to federal court.317 
Home Depot asked the Court to clarify that a third-party 
defendant—a party that was a defendant to a counterclaim but was 
not a plaintiff in any capacity—has the same removal rights as any 
other defendant in the case. Construing the language of § 1441(a), 
Home Depot noted that the general removal statute was 
unambiguous in conferring removal rights on defendants. Nothing 
in the statutory language suggested that a third-party counterclaim 
defendant in a state court action should not be treated as a 
defendant who was entitled to remove a case.318  
Moreover, consistent with the rationales for removal, if a third-
party was an out-of-state defendant, that party should be entitled 
to removal even if the basis is a counterclaim. Thus, Home Depot 
maintained that the same local bias concerns that animated the 
Framers to provide defendants with a removal right should logically 
extend to protect out-of-state third-party defendants.319 
 
 316. Id. at 15–31. 
 317. Id. at 13. 
 318. Id. at 17. 
 319. Id. at 24–32. 
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In addition, Home Depot maintained that Congress intentionally 
expanded the notion of who could remove a case to federal court 
when it enacted CAFA, by choosing to designate that “any 
defendant” could exercise the right of removal of a state-based class 
action. Home Depot suggested that because a third-party 
defendant qualified as a defendant for the purposes of the general 
removal statute, a third-party defendant therefore also came within 
the CAFA language permitting removal by “any defendant.” 
Simply put, Home Depot stated that its argument “boils down to 
this: ‘any defendant’ means any defendant.”320 
At length, Home Depot rehearsed the CAFA legislative history 
generally, noting that Congress intended to relieve defendants 
from abusive state class action litigation and provide defendants 
sued in state courts the ability to remove these cases into federal 
court. To this end, Congress deliberately liberalized CAFA removal 
provisions in § 1453 to enable class action defendants to remove 
more easily than under the general removal statutes. Thus, to 
endorse a rule that prohibited third-party class action counterclaim 
defendants from removing state class actions to federal court 
significantly undermined the purposes of CAFA.321 
Home Depot pointed out that the prevailing circuit court 
holdings that deny removal to third-party class action counterclaim 
defendants had encouraged gamesmanship on the part of class 
action lawyers. Thus, in order to evade the CAFA removal 
provisions, some plaintiffs’ attorneys had hit upon the stratagem of 
filing state class actions as counterclaims, thereby evading CAFA 
removal. As a consequence of this misinterpretation of Shamrock 
Oil, Home Depot argued, it had been left stuck defending against a 
consumer class action in state court, without any right of removal, 
and against its will.322 
In response, Jackson simply argued that CAFA did not create 
an exception to Shamrock Oil’s longstanding rule that prohibits a 
counterclaim defendant from removing a case to federal court.323 
Initially, Jackson pointed out that every circuit court that had 
 
 320. Id. at 13. 
 321. Id. at 32–45. 
 322. Id. at 41–45. 
 323. Brief for Respondent at 14, Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (2019) 
(No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 6584716. 
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considered this same issue has decided there was no right of 
removal, and therefore there was no conflict among the circuit 
courts that justified the Supreme Court re-examining this removal 
issue. In addition, Jackson noted that the Court had denied 
certiorari on this same issue three times in recent years, including 
an appeal by Home Depot just the year prior in another similar 
case.324 
Jackson argued that four circuit courts, in eight decisions 
relating to CAFA removal in the thirteen years since CAFA’s 
enactment, have correctly construed CAFA to bar removal by 
counterclaim defendants.325 Jackson noted that the appellate 
decisions on this narrow issue had been remarkable in their 
consistency, holding that the term “defendant” in CAFA means the 
same thing as in Shamrock Oil and its progeny.326 Moreover, the 
Respondent suggested that a circuit split was unlikely to develop 
given that the courts had found Home Depot’s arguments to be 
unpersuasive and were likely to continue to do so.327 
Jackson’s response to Home Depot’s arguments was chiefly 
grounded in principles of careful statutory construction. In rebuttal 
to Home Depot’s contention that Congress’s use of the term “any 
defendant” in CAFA extended the removal right to counterclaim 
defendants, Jackson argued that in using the word “any,” Congress 
intended to eliminate the judicially recognized rule that all 
defendants must consent to removal.328 However, there was no 
indication that Congress intended to alter the traditional rule that 
only an original defendant may remove a case to federal court. 
Hence, Jackson contended that Home Depot was attempting to give 
the word “any” a meaning it cannot bear, and the word “any” 
cannot be used to change the meaning of the word “defendant.”329 
Furthermore, Jackson found additional support for his statutory 
construction argument in CAFA’s express statement that class 
actions are to be removed in accordance with the removal provision 
 
 324. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 1, Home Depot, 139 S. Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 
2018 WL 3199156; see also Tri-State Water Treatment, Inc. v. Bauer, 845 F.3d 350 (7th Cir. 
2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2138  
 325. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition, supra note 324, at 6, 11. 
 326. Id. at 11. 
 327. Brief for Respondent, supra note 323, at 37–38. 
 328. Id. at 37. 
 329. Id. at 38. 
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in § 1446. Section 1446 sets forth technical procedures for removal. 
This provision echoes § 1441(a) and Shamrock Oil in referring to 
removal by “[a] defendant or defendants.” Thus, argued Jackson, it 
would be incoherent to give the word “defendant” as used in 
CAFA a more expansive meaning when CAFA itself incorporates 
by reference procedures that apply to traditional classes of 
defendants. Nothing in the statutory language of CAFA called for 
a different construction of the term defendant than is used in the 
pre-existing removal statutes.330 
Jackson further claimed that the nub of the issue presented was 
not really the scope of the Court’s Shamrock Oil holding. Jackson 
noted that Home Depot had not asked the Court to overrule 
Shamrock Oil, and had disavowed any intention to challenge the 
correctness of the Shamrock Oil ruling that precludes third-party 
counter-defendant’s removal rights under § 1441.331 Instead, 
Jackson suggested that the only question was whether Congress 
altered the understanding of the word “defendant” (as used in 
§ 1441) when Congress enacted CAFA. This issue, Jackson remarked, 
was an issue of congressional intent, and not the scope of Shamrock 
Oil’s holding.332 
In response to Home Depot’s policy arguments, Jackson 
countered that Home Depot’s forecasts of gamesmanship and 
parade of horribles consisted largely of chimerical monsters.333 
Jackson noted that in contrast to Home Depot’s exaggerated claims, 
the reality was that in more than a dozen years since CAFA’s 
enactment, the issue concerning the removability of class 
counterclaims had produced only eight appellate cases in four 
circuits. This paucity of cases, Jackson suggested, was a mere drop 
in the bucket compared to the hundreds of cases filed in state court 
and removed under CAFA.334 
Moreover, Jackson submitted, the scarcity of cases raising this 
issue might be explained by the fact that consumers and their 
lawyers have little or no control over where they may be sued, or 
more likely will lack the resources to pursue class action 
 
 330. Id. at 29–30. 
 331. Id. at 14. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 24. 
 334. Id. at 24–25. 
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counterclaims.335 Thus, “[s]peculation that ‘wily’ class action 
lawyers are lulling corporate plaintiffs into suing their clients in so-
called ‘magnet jurisdictions’ to generate non-removable class actions 
is unrealistic, to say the least.”336 
Finally, Jackson suggested that Home Depot and those amici 
who shared its belief that the courts’ interpretations of the CAFA 
removal provision created a loophole that undermined its 
purposes, have a remedy: they should take their complaint to 
Congress to amend CAFA to expressly permit counterclaim 
defendant removal.337 
C. The Court’s Home Depot Opinions: Saving State Court Jurisdiction 
The Court in Home Depot issued a split 5-4 decision. The Court’s 
majority opinion, authored by Justice Thomas, largely tracked 
Jackson’s arguments, narrowly construing both the statutory 
language of the general removal statute and its historical 
application. Similarly, the dissenting opinion, authored by Justice 
Alito, closely adopted Home Depot’s arguments on appeal. Home 
Depot, then, was a victory for both plaintiffs’ class action lawyers 
and state courts to retain jurisdiction over state class actions. 
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, construing both the general 
removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and the CAFA removal 
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b), concluded that the term “defendant” 
refers only to a party that an original plaintiff sues, and not to any 
other type of defendant.338 Considering the phrase “defendant or 
the defendants” in the structure of the removal statutes, as well as 
the Court’s precedents, the majority held that § 1441(a) does not 
permit removal by a counterclaim defendant, including parties 
who are brought into the litigation for the first time by a 
counterclaim.339 
The majority noted that the removal statutes apply to civil 
actions, not to claims—citing precedent for the proposition that 
 
 335. Id. at 25. 
 336. Linda S. Mullenix, Just Who is a Defendant? Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants’ 
Removal Rights Under CAFA, PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 581 (2019), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3311178. 
 337. Brief for Respondent, supra note 323, at 26. 
 338. Home Depot U.S.A. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1745–46 (2019). 
 339. Id. at 1748. 
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counterclaims cannot serve as the basis for federal court 
jurisdiction.340 The Court held that § 1441(a) does not permit 
removal based on a counterclaim at all, because a counterclaim is 
irrelevant to whether a district court has original jurisdiction over 
a civil action.341 In addition, the Court analyzed the use of the term 
“defendant” in related procedural contexts and concluded that 
Congress did not intend for the term “defendant or defendants” in 
the general removal statute to include third-party counterclaim 
defendants.342 Finally, the majority cited its decision in Shamrock Oil 
to further undergird its conclusion that third-party counterclaim 
defendants were not defendants who could remove under 
§ 1441(a).343 
Regarding Home Depot’s contention that the language in 
CAFA’s removal provision § 1453(b)—referring to removability by 
“‘any defendant’ to a ‘class action’”—the majority indicated that it 
agreed with Jackson’s interpretation and not Home Depot’s more 
expansive view.344 The Court held that, interpreting the general 
removal and CAFA removal provisions together, the CAFA 
removal provision, like § 1441(a), did not permit third-party 
counterclaim removal.345 Carefully parsing CAFA’s various 
removal provisions and statutory language, the Court concluded 
that nothing in the CAFA removal provisions altered § 1441(a)’s 
limitation on who can remove. Further, the Court indicated that 
this suggested that Congress intended to keep the removability 
limitation to original defendants in place.346 
Finally, the majority agreed that if Home Depot did not like the 
majority’s interpretation, because it enabled a tactic to prevent 
removal, this result was a consequence of the statute that Congress 
wrote.347 Thus, the majority opinion concluded with an invitation 
to Congress to amend the statute, if Congress shared the dissenting 
Justice’s disapproval of the majority’s holdings.348 
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. at 1749 (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 14). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 1750 (although the majority admitted this was a “closer question”). 
 345. Id. at 1751. 
 346. Id. at 1750. 
 347. Id. at 1751. 
 348. Id. 
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At the very outset of his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito made 
oblique reference to the underlying purposes of CAFA; that is, 
Congress’s concern with unfavorable, plaintiff-biased state court 
forums for the resolution of class action litigation. Thus, he noted, 
“The rule of law requires neutral forums for resolving disputes. 
Courts are designed to provide just that. But our legal system takes 
seriously the risk that for certain cases, some neutral forums might 
be more neutral than others.”349 Building on this foundational 
principle, Justice Alito noted that the general removal statute ensured 
that defendants get an equal chance to choose a federal forum.350 
The dissenting opinion largely focuses on CAFA’s language 
that permits removal “by any defendant,” and largely tracks the 
statutory exegesis advanced by Home Depot. The dissenting opinion 
goes to great lengths to attempt to rationalize and integrate the 
removal provisions consistently, invoking canons of statutory 
construction, dictionary definitions, and judicial precedent,351 
including a limited reading of the scope of the Shamrock Oil decision 
(so as not to apply at all to counterclaim defendants).352 
Apart from the lengthy analyses in statutory construction, 
much of the dissent resorts to the underlying purpose of CAFA that 
framed the dissenting opinion’s opening passages. Thus, the 
opinion rehearses the history of CAFA and other Congressional 
initiatives to curb perceived abuses of class action litigation.353 
Commenting on Congress’s intent in enacting CAFA, Justice Alito 
noted that Congress was concerned that state courts were biased 
against class action defendants and had passed CAFA to facilitate 
removal of state class actions to federal court, “by any 
defendant.”354 
Hence, the dissenting Justices contended that both original 
defendants and third-party counterclaim defendants were 
 
 349. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 1755–61. 
 352. Id. at 1761–62 (contending that Shamrock Oil says nothing about the removability 
of counterclaim defendants, and therefore has no application to Home Depot’s case). In 
addition, Justice Alito also rejected the majority’s reliance on the so-called well-pleaded 
complaint rule for its conclusions. Justice Alito suggested that the well-pleaded complaint 
rule was based on policy concerns that did not arise in the context of the Home Depot 
litigation. Id. at 1763–64. 
 353. Id. at 1752–54. 
 354. Id. at 1751. 
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“defendants” under both the general and CAFA removal 
statutes.355 Both kinds of parties were defendants to legal claims 
and neither chose to be in state court. “Both might face bias there, 
and with it the potential for crippling unjust losses.”356 The majority 
opinion, Justice Alito asserted, “reads an irrational distinction into 
both [the] removal laws and flouts their plain meaning, a meaning 
that context confirms and today’s majority simply ignores.”357 
In concluding his CAFA discussion, Justice Alito noted that by 
conflating the definition of “defendant” in both the general and 
CAFA removal statutes, courts had created a loophole tactic that 
permitted plaintiffs to raise a class action claim as a counterclaim 
and hope that CAFA would not authorize removal. This loophole 
tactic, Justice Alito suggested, subverted CAFA’s evident aims.358 
D. The Implications of Home Depot 
 for Federal-State Class Action Litigation 
The significance of the Home Depot decision lays in its policy 
implications for litigation gamesmanship. In their arguments to the 
Court, both Home Depot and Jackson spelled out the potential 
implications of the Court’s decision. It remains to be seen whether 
the prophesying by either party will be realized in the years to 
come. One may expect that while plaintiffs’ attorneys welcome the 
opportunity to pursue class litigation in state court immune from 
CAFA removal, this opportunity may be cabined by the unique 
circumstances that give rise to the situation in which a plaintiff 
asserts a class action counterclaim against a third-party defendant. 
Home Depot argued that class action plaintiffs’ attorneys, who 
prefer to litigate class actions in favorable state court forums, have 
seized upon the tactic of making their class actions removal-proof 
by asserting class claims as counterclaims. Home Depot contended 
 
 355. Id. at 1751–52. 
 356. Id. at 1752. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 1755. Justice Alito protested:  
“I can think of no rational purpose for this limit on which defendants may remove. 
Even respondent does not try to defend its rationality, suggesting instead that it 
simply reflects a legislative compromise. Yet there is no evidence that anyone 
thought of this potential loophole before CAFA was enacted, and it is hard to 
believe that any of CAFA’s would-be opponents agreed to vote for it in exchange 
for this way of keeping some cases in state court.”  
Id. 
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that because of this constricted view of who constitutes a defendant 
for removal purposes, it was unable to remove the class action 
counterclaim by which it was involuntarily brought into the 
litigation. Home Depot complains that it was unfairly stuck in a 
state court forum not of its choosing. 
In addition, corporate defendants clearly prefer to adjudicate 
class claims in more favorable federal forums. Home Depot pointed 
out that the risks for financial institutions are similarly high. Thus, 
according to Home Depot, financial institutions will now think 
twice about bringing individual collection actions in state court, 
only to find themselves subject to non-removable class action 
counterclaims. It remains to be seen if corporate defendants will 
restrain from bringing collection actions in state court under the 
fear of retaliatory consumer class counterclaims. Home Depot’s 
concern about strategic pleading to evade CAFA was supported by 
an array of defense-oriented organizations that filed amicus briefs 
on behalf of Home Depot.359 
Jackson, however, countered that these hypothesized scenarios 
were largely over-stated, as evidenced by the scarcity of actual 
cases where counterclaim defendants in state class litigation have 
been denied removal to federal court. We will have to wait to see if 
there is a proliferation of consumer class action counterclaims 
brought when a plaintiff (or financial institution) sues an original 
defendant in state court. 
Finally, it may come to pass that a Congress will heed the 
majority’s suggestion that, if Congress does not like the result in 
Home Depot, it can go back to the legislative drawing board to clarify 
whether third-party counterclaim defendants may remove class 
actions against defendants sued in state court. 
 
 359. See, e.g., Brief of DRI—The Voice of the Def. Bar as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 6062446; Brief of the Prod. Liab. 
Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 
(No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 2427598; Brief for Amici Curiae Retail Litig. Ctr., Inc., Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S., and the Prod. Liab. Advisory Council, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, 
Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 6040478; Brief for Amici Curiae Retail 
Litig. Ctr., Inc. and Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. in Support of Petitioner, Home Depot, 
139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 2018 WL 2412127; Brief of Wash. Legal Found. and Allied Educ. 
Found. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Home Depot, 139 S.Ct. 1743 (No. 17-1471), 
2018 WL 6040477. 
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The prevailing post-CAFA narrative posits we live in an era of 
federalized class actions. While there is some empirical evidence to 
support this thesis,360 other scholarly studies suggest that the class 
action landscape is perhaps more complicated.361 In addition, the 
post-CAFA narrative incorporates a kind of procedural conspiracy 
theory, suggesting that in the twenty-first century a corporate-
favoring Congress and a conservative Court have indirectly 
colluded to suppress class litigation.362 In this telling, Congress and 
the Court, in behest of their corporate sponsors, have pursued an 
anti-plaintiff, pro-corporate class action agenda through legislation 
and judicial fiat. The greatest manifestation of this agenda, then, 
was CAFA itself, with the goal of federalizing class litigation in 
federal court for the purpose of subverting and defeating class 
litigation.363 
And yet in the fifteen years since CAFA’s enactment, states 
have maintained a role in private and public complex or aggregate 
litigation enforcement. It is simply not true that all class litigation 
has been effectively federalized; a more nuanced appreciation of 
dual court system litigation is in order. While many federal courts 
historically have intervened in state proceedings to protect pending 
federal class settlements, courts have not always applied 
abstention, Anti-Injunction, and Erie doctrines in derogation of 
state court litigation. 
Contrary to the prevalent notion that the Court ideologically 
favors corporate defendants in class litigation, the Court instead 
 
 360. See generally Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action 
Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1723 (2008) (documenting an uptick of removal filings post-CAFA). 
 361. See Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of 
Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (reporting data 
on class action filings post-CAFA; suggesting multiple explanations for decline in both state 
and federal class actions filings after CAFA). 
 362. Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and 
Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (”[A]ny sentient reader of [CAFA]’s 
statement of findings and purposes [would recognize that t]hey are, at best, window 
dressing. Less charitably, they meet the philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s definition of 
‘bullshit,’ because they are made with apparent indifference to their truth content.” (footnote 
omitted)); Burbank, supra note 165, at 1440–44. 
 363. Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1816 (2008) (describing the goal of many of CAFA’s proponents to defeat class actions 
against them). 
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has issued decisions that have preserved the ability of state courts 
to determine class certification issues under state rules and that 
have preserved the ability of state attorneys general to pursue 
aggregate relief on behalf of state citizens in parens patriae litigation. 
In addition, the Court’s decision in the Home Depot class 
counterclaim litigation reflects a jurisprudence favoring state court 
retention of class litigation, immunized from CAFA removal. 
Rather than favoring defendants, these decisions have been 
decidedly pro-plaintiff, especially for states, such as West Virginia, 
which embrace a liberal class action jurisprudence and Mississippi 
with an aggressively pro-plaintiff state AG. 
The corporate-favoring CAFA narrative is predicated on the 
assumption that, with regard to class litigation, state courts 
generally are plaintiff-favoring while federal courts generally are 
defendant-favoring. Not only is this an over-simplification of 
judicial biases, but not every state-filed class litigation has been 
successfully removed to federal court to accomplish a defendant-
favoring outcome. CAFA’s home state and local controversy 
exceptions have carved out a domain for state retention of class 
litigation. As CAFA jurisprudence has developed, several federal 
courts (presumably defendant-favoring forums) have applied 
liberal constructions of CAFA’s formal rules to enable states to 
maintain class litigation of local concern. This phenomenon 
complicates the portrait of CAFA as a legislatively pro-defendant 
scheme intended to federalize class action litigation. 
It is also worth noting that in the Court’s decisions touching on 
the allocation of complex litigation between federal and state 
courts, the Court has achieved a unanimity that seems to belie 
ideological orientations—and contrasts with the Court’s otherwise 
ideologically fractured decisions in other types of appeals. How is 
one to explain this odd-bedfellows convergence of decision-making 
concerning the Court’s cases that implicate dual system complex 
litigation? At least one possible explanation is that the Court’s 
conservative wing recognizes the federalism values in preserving 
state court autonomy, while the Court’s liberal wing pragmatically 
endorses results that best empower plaintiffs to vindicate their 
rights—that is, in state court forums. 
The “federalization” narrative of class action litigation is further 
complicated by the shift, in the past decade, towards federal 
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multidistrict procedure means for resolving aggregate litigation.364 
This well-documented phenomenon adds another nuanced layer to 
an appreciation concerning how complex litigation currently 
is handled in a dual court system. Aggregate litigation that is 
transferred and consolidated under MDL auspices may or may not 
be resolved by class action settlements.365 In addition, federal MDL 
procedure may incompletely capture all related litigation because 
state non-removable class litigation will remain outside the reach 
of federal global settlements. 
Thus, not only do we live in a post-CAFA era, but we live in a 
post-class action era.366 In recognition of this reality, one scholar has 
suggested that the existence of non-removable state class litigation 
“hold[s] promise, if properly harnessed, as [a] mechanism[] for 
achieving the goals of aggregate litigation and for meeting the 
challenges presented by the reality that mass litigation settlements 
occupy an important regulatory role in the American legal 
system.”367 This scholar creatively has suggested that parallel non-
removable state class litigation can help discipline federal mass 
litigation settlements in four keys ways:  
one, by providing needed real-world data for use in any ultimate 
settlement grid; two, by ensuring greater legitimacy of those 
settlements as mechanisms of governance; three, by potentially 
making any ultimate settlements fairer to litigants; and four, by 
providing settlement finality through greater assurance that any 
resulting settlement terms will stick.368 
In the post-CAFA enthusiasm inspired by the nationalization of 
class litigation, the federalism issues engendered by CAFA have 
gone largely unnoticed and unremarked. Professor Stephen 
Burbank, commenting on CAFA’s complicated jurisdictional 
 
 364. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018) (multidistrict litigation statute). See generally Andrew D. 
Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1168–69 (2018) 
(reporting statistics of MDL proceedings in federal courts). 
 365. See Linda S. Mullenix, Policing MDL Non-Class Settlements: Empowering Judges 
Through the All Writs Act, 37 REV. LITIG. 129, 153–60 (2018) (discussing MDL non-class 
settlements); Amy L. Saack, Global Settlements in Non-Class MDL Mass Torts, 21 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 847 (2017) (same). 
 366. Glover, supra note 4. 
 367. Id. at 7. 
 368. Id. 
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scheme, has called CAFA “an affront to federalism.”369 Without 
regard to whether the Court has endorsed an implicit federalism of 
class litigation, state courts nonetheless, under federalism principles, 
have retained the right to adjudicate aggregate litigation in their 
courts. This includes the authority to “define the features of 
aggregate litigation, and the procedural framework” for resolving 
it.370 In this view, a nationalized, homogeneous class certification 
jurisprudence, based on federal courts’ narrowest interpretation of 
Rule 23, “is fundamentally at odds with the constitutional division 
of function[s]” between federal and state courts.371 
In conclusion, the prevailing CAFA narrative concerning 
federalization of class action litigation needs to be tempered with 
an appreciation of the Court’s several decisions touching on the 
states’ authority to adjudicate complex litigation in their own 
courts. As discussed above, although the Court’s decisions rarely 
explicitly invoke federalism theories, several scholars have 
suggested that the Court instead has hazarded an “accidental 
federalism” that has constrained federal class litigation, based on 
 
 369. Burbank, supra note 165, at 1446–47. 
Ultimately, a combination of special interest overreaching, abetted by the fictions 
of corporate citizenship, and confusion about legislative aims, abetted by the 
institutional federal judiciary’s schizophrenia regarding overlapping class actions, 
led Congress to lose sight of its duty, when fashioning CAFA’s exceptions, to 
preserve the “happy relation of States to Nation.” As a result, CAFA represents an 
affront to federalism in two respects and a potential affront in a third. 
First, CAFA deprives states of the ability to regulate matters of intense local 
interest by enlisting for that purpose the regulatory potential of the class action as 
the states conceive it, on the basis of a definition of national interest that rests on 
legal fictions and on a vision of aggregate litigation that ignores the costs of 
complexity. Second, and quite apart from the regulatory void that CAFA may 
entail, the means by which Congress reached that result are deplorable. Working 
with exceptions so complicated that even some academics have been unable to 
penetrate them—and in a fog of ambiguity and hypocrisy—Congress sacrificed 
transparency and accountability in the interests of preserving deniability. Third, 
by exalting the gathering powers of the federal courts, Congress has created 
incentives for litigants and courts to create ever bigger “litigations.” Whether in 
the form of multistate class actions or through nonclass aggregations, such 
litigation packages may replicate in federal court some of the supposed abuses in 
state court class actions to which CAFA supposedly responded, including the 
subordination of factual and legal differences of intense interest to individual 
states. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 370. Margaret S. Thomas, Constitutionalizing Class Certification, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1024, 
1069 (2017). 
 371. Id. at 1070. 
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rationales that are independent of federalism concerns.372 In this 
view, “the Court’s class action cases might, in fact, reflect an un-
theorized or intuitive sense that federalism principles shape federal 
courts’ use of the class action.”373 Thus, it is worth noting that the 
Court, in recognizing the autonomy of state courts to resolve 
complex litigation, may implicitly have been countering the 
“affront to federalism” that is embodied in CAFA. 
 
 
 372. Moller, supra note 121, at 862–63 (citing Glover’s “happenstantial” federalism). 
 373. Id. 
